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ABSTRACT
This thesis reviews the extent to which the introduction of a right to legal assistance 
(RLA) during detention has improved the protection of suspects following: (i) changes 
that have been made in the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and 
Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 and (ii) changes proposed in legislation stemming from 
Lord Carloway’s Review, namely  the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill that is currently 
progressing through the Scottish Parliament. It will do this by identifying and then 
assessing the four main protections facilitated by the newly introduced RLA in the post-
Cadder Scottish criminal justice system. The likely effect on a suspect following the 
implementation of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill in conjunction with the limited 
safeguards which have been incorporated into the Bill as it stands at  present, means that 
the enhanced protections intended to ensure increased fairness and justice for all 
suspects, may  in fact  largely nullify the intentions of both the Cadder ruling and Lord 
Carloway’s recommendations, however well intentioned both were. This thesis 
concludes that with a lack of adequate safeguards in place, combined with high rates of 
waiver, an increase in the time a suspect can now be detained, and the removal of that 
cornerstone of criminal procedure, corroboration, all conspire to make a suspect less 
protected than he would have been prior to the introduction of the RLA in the 2010 Act.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction to the thesis
The aim of this thesis is to assess the extent to which the introduction of a right to legal 
assistance (RLA) during detention has improved the protection of suspects in a number 
of key  areas, namely the prevention of ill treatment, the prevention of emotional 
distress, understanding and enforcing the right to silence and the prevention of wrongful 
conviction.1 In addressing this aim, I will argue that, despite the introduction of a RLA, 
suspects are not left better protected overall by the changes that have occurred post-
Cadder in Scotland. In order to make this argument I will assess each of the areas of 
protection identified above individually, having regard to the changes that have been 
already made by way of the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and 
Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 and also the proposed legislation currently going through 
the Scottish Parliament, that of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill, introduced on 20 
June 2013. I will conclude that although the RLA does offer some degree of additional 
protection in these areas, the fact that a significant proportion of suspects are likely  to 
waive their RLA, combined with the increase in maximum detention times and the 
removal of the requirement for corroboration, means that the position that suspects are 
left in is far from improved.
One case more than any other was the catalyst for change within the Scottish criminal 
justice system, that of Cadder v HM Advocate.2  Peter Cadder declined to have a 
solicitor notified of his detention and therefore received no legal assistance whilst  in 
custody. During police examination Mr Cadder made various incriminating admissions. 
Following his conviction, he claimed that the Crown’s reliance on the admissions made 
during his police examination at his subsequent trial, breached Article 6 of the ECHR.3 
Following an unsuccessful appeal at the High Court of Justiciary, Mr Cadder’s case was 
1
1 As chapter 3 will explain, these are drawn from F Leverick “The right to legal assistance during 
detention”, 2011 15(3) Edin. L.R. 361-375.
2 [2010] UKSC 43, 2010 SLT 1125.
3 At para 10.
heard by the UK Supreme Court, which ruled that the law in Scotland was incompatible 
with Article 6 of the ECHR in allowing a suspect to be detained and questioned by 
police without having access to legal advice.4 
The Scottish Government moved fast, and passed the Criminal Procedure (Legal 
Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 within 24 hours of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling. It stated that this was done in order to ensure that, “Scottish 
practice accords with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
to ensure the effective functioning of the criminal justice system following the 
[Supreme Court’s] judgement.”5  The Act introduced a right to a private consultation 
with a solicitor both before any questioning begins and at any other time during 
questioning.6
The Cadder judgement caused shock waves to reverberate throughout the Scottish legal 
system, beyond the immediacy of the ruling itself. The Crown Office and Procurator 
Fiscal Service (COPFS) said that, “At the time of the ruling in October 2010, [it] 
estimated that there were 3,471 cases where the issue of the admissibility of evidence 
from police interviews had been raised by  the defence”.7  As an immediate result of the 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cadder, the Crown did not proceed with a total of 867 
prosecutions.8 However, for the purposes of this thesis, the most important effect of the 
decision was that it started a chain reaction of events that led, via Lord Carloway’s 
Review,9  to a whole series of other changes including the proposal to remove the 
corroboration requirement10  and an increase in the maximum time permitted for 
2
4 At para 50 per Lord Hope; para 93 per Lord Rodger.
5 Policy memorandum accompanying the 2010 Act, para 2.
6 s.15A(7) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 as inserted by the 2010 Act.
7 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, “Crown review of cases after Cadder v 
HMA” (news release), 9 Feb 2011, available at www.copfs.gov/News/Releases/2011/02/Crown-
review-cases-after-Cadder-V-HMA.
8 Ibid.
9 The Carloway Review: Report and Recommendations (November 17, 2011) (Carloway 
Report) available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource?Doc/925/0122808.pdf [Accessed 
September 20, 2013]
10 Report para 7.2.55.
detention.11 These changes are now contained in the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill, 
introduced on 20 June 2013. 
Some legal academics and lawyers have argued that  the introduction of a RLA was 
unnecessary  in Scotland. Ferguson suggests that, “The unintended legacy  of Cadder 
may  be the dismantling of key protections for accused persons within the Scottish 
system of criminal procedure” and that the Supreme Court may have inadvertently 
begun a process of chain reaction ultimately leading to a suspect being less well 
protected, not more.12 Others have argued that the RLA would lead to an increase in 
protection for suspects in a number of respects. For example, Leverick suggests that the 
RLA can help to enforce a suspect’s right to silence and may have a role to play in 
preventing wrongful conviction.13 I intend to assess these competing claims in the light 
of the changes that are now going to be made to the Scottish criminal justice system 
following Lord Carloway’s review. 
1.2 Terminology of the thesis
I have chosen to use the term “right to legal assistance” rather than “right to legal 
advice” because the presence of a solicitor during detention may do more than simply 
advise suspects - for example, the solicitor may also explain their rights, check the 
conditions of their detention or help them to enforce their rights while being interviewed 
by the police. 
1.3 Defining the scope of the thesis
My thesis does have one important limitation which is that it has been necessary  to 
submit it before knowing how the chain of events started by Cadder will end. The thesis 
takes account of legal developments up until the end of May  2014. At this point the 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill is on hold pending the results of a review that will be 
3
11 Report para 5.2.38.
12 PR Ferguson, “Repercussions of the Cadder case: the ECHR’s fair trial provisions and 
Scottish criminal procedure” [2011] Crim LR 743.
13 Leverick, n 1 above, 361-375.
carried out by Lord Bonomy of additional safeguards that may  be necessary following 
the removal of the corroboration requirement.14  This may result in further 
developments, but my conclusion will address this point.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
The structure of the thesis will proceed as follows. First chapter one will set out the 
aims and objectives of the thesis. Chapter two will then detail the development of the 
RLA in Scotland noting its evolution and changes that have been proposed to the 
Scottish criminal justice system as a result of this right. Chapter three will attempt to 
assess whether or not  suspects are left better protected by  the changes in the law as a 
result of the Cadder judgement. It will do this by identifying what it is that we are 
trying to protect  suspects from and assessing each protection in turn. Chapter four will 
examine the issue of waiver of the RLA and will re-assess the conclusions of chapter 
three in the light of this. Lastly, chapter five will reach an overall conclusion, namely 
that the introduction of a RLA has improved protections in a limited manner, but has 
lessened the overall protections a suspect enjoyed pre-Cadder, especially given that a 
significant proportion of suspects are likely to waive their RLA.
4
14 See Scottish Government News Release, “Group to examine corroboration safeguards”, 6 
February 2014, available at http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/Group-to-examine-corroboration-
safeguards-8fe.aspx.
CHAPTER 2
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN 
SCOTLAND
2.1 Introduction
This chapter charts the development of the right to legal assistance (RLA) in Scotland, 
noting the main developments relating to the right itself and also the other key  changes 
that have been proposed to the justice system as a result of the introduction of this right. 
As such, it starts by examining the pre-Cadder position, the case of Cadder itself and 
the changes contained in the government’s emergency legislation that  was passed to 
address the Cadder decision. It  then goes on to examine the relevant recommendations 
of the Carloway Review, which was set up in the wake of Cadder, and the relevant 
provisions of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill. The aim in this chapter is primarily to 
describe and set out background material that will be analysed in chapters three and 
four.  
2.2 Historical  development from the 19th Century to the Criminal  Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1995
In the early 19th century, a crime would be investigated jointly by a sheriff of the 
jurisdiction in which it had taken place, alongside a local procurator fiscal whom the 
sheriff would appoint to provide assistance. As the police force was only emerging as a 
coherent body at this time, a sheriff relied upon a fiscal for investigative and 
examination purposes. Whilst the notion of such close ties between these particular 
arms of the criminal justice system might cause the modern jurist sleepless nights, this 
collaboration was normal practice.1 It was only  with the enactment of the Sheriff Courts 
and Legal Officers (Scotland) Act 1927,2  that this connection was broken. The Act 
assigned the right of appointment of a procurator fiscal to the Lord Advocate. By the 
middle of the 19th century the sheriff had taken on a more judicial role ensuring the 
rights of the suspect were adhered to, leaving the interrogative role to the procurator 
5
1 Cadder at para 74 per Lord Rodger.
2 S.1(2), Appointment of sheriff clerk and procurator fiscal.
fiscal. Macdonald describes this as being necessary for a sheriff, “...as it is his duty  to 
protect him from any unfair or oppressive examination (the prisoner not being permitted 
legal advice)”.3 
The first sign that legal assistance at the pre-trial stage was becoming a formal privilege 
was the enactment of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887. This allowed a 
suspect the right to consult with, and have present during judicial questioning, a person 
of legal standing.4 Section 17 states that a lawyer be informed of the suspect’s detention 
for examination and that he “...be entitled to have a private interview with the person 
accused before he is examined on declaration, and to be present at such examination”. 
The following year this right was subsequently strengthened by case law. In Goodall,5 
Lord McLaren held that where the charge was serious, (the instant case being a charge 
of murder against an illiterate woman), the magistrate should inform the accused of his 
RLA. In this case, because this had not been done, a declaration made by the suspect 
was rejected as inadmissible. By means of a pre-judicial examination audience between 
the suspect and his “law agent”, the suspect now had for the first time access to a 
protective mechanism enshrined in law that, if utilised, would provide him with legal 
advice and assistance. 
The birth of what we have come to know as the modern Police Force was continuing 
apace. With the advent of “burgh” police forces,6 later developing into a police force 
with a county structure,7 increasingly  it was the police who began to take the lead role 
in investigating any alleged crime. Although police examination was now an integral 
part of the judicial examination process, the question of legal assistance raised its head 
once again. If the police questioned a suspect independently, he would not be afforded 
the legal protection of a consultation with his law agent. However, if taken to court, he 
would be provided with the full protection of a consultation with his lawyer before 
questioning alongside the right to have his lawyer present during the judicial 
6
3 Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland (first edition,1867), p290.
4 Described in s.17 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887 as a ‘law agent’.
5 HM Advocate v Goodall (1882) 2 White 1.
6 Under the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1833. 
7 Police (Scotland) Act 1857.
examination itself. In reality it became practice that after arrest and charge, the suspect 
could only be questioned further under judicial examination. If the accused voluntarily 
gave a statement to the police upon arrest, this was, however, deemed to be acceptable. 
The fact that the suspect had not benefited from the shield of protection afforded by 
court judicial examination was not considered relevant.8  However, following the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1898, which afforded the accused the right to give testimony 
during his trial,9  and the Summary Procedure (Scotland) Act 1908, which gave the 
accused the right  to emit a declaration,10  judicial examination was on the wane.11 
Subsequently, as judicial examination was being used less, the police appetite to 
question a suspect upon arrest correspondingly diminished. 
The police soon found themselves in a legal no-mans land. Could they  question a 
suspect before arrest, in the hope of eliciting from him enough evidence to warrant a 
charge? The first obstacle to overcome was the fact that there did not exist any legal 
basis for a suspect to be detained by the police prior to arrest. Unfortunately for the 
suspects concerned, the lack of a right to legal advice meant that most were not aware of 
this.12  Cases exist that show that suspects proceeded to provide voluntary  statements 
which were deemed admissible.13 In Chalmers v HM Advocate,14 Lord Justice General 
Cooper made clear the shortcomings in such evidence when considering the issue of 
what is a fairly obtained statement:15 
7
8 Cadder at paras 80-81 per Lord Rodger.
9 S.2, Evidence of Person Charged.
10 S.77(1).
11 In his Report, Lord Carloway subsequently recommended the abolition of judicial examination 
due to dis-use (see para 6.2.64). The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill reflects this 
recommendation (see s.63).
12 Cadder at para 83 per Lord Rodger.
13 Hartley v HM Advocate 1979 SLT 26.
14 1954 JC 66.
15 At 75.
“I recognise that in several cases distinctions have been properly  drawn 
between “routine questioning”, during exploratory police investigation of a 
crime, and the interrogation of prisoners, after arrest or in a prison awaiting 
trial. But when a person is brought by police officers in a police van to a police 
station, and, while there alone, is faced with police officers of high rank, I 
cannot think that the need for protection is any less than it would have been if 
he had been formally apprehended. The ordinary person is not to know that  he 
could have refused to be taken to the police station or to answer any questions, 
and, even if he knew that, he would be unlikely to adopt such a course and it 
would probably avail him little if he did.”
This position changed following a proposal from the Thomson Committee on Criminal 
Procedure in Scotland.16 On the recommendation of the Thomson Committee, a six hour 
detention period was introduced whereby a suspect  could be detained by  the police for 
questioning without a mandatory right of access to a solicitor.17 The prevailing mood of 
the Committee was one of concern that  the suspect’s rights may somehow interfere with 
the course of justice, “...creating a situation in which criminals can render the 
investigation of their crimes difficult or even impossible merely  by standing on their 
rights”.18 This can be clearly  seen in the following paragraph taken from the Thomson 
Committee’s report:
“Although a person who has been charged with an offence is entitled to an 
interview with a solicitor, we recommend that a solicitor should not be 
permitted to intervene in police investigations before charge. The purpose of 
the interrogation is to obtain from the suspect such information as he may 
possess regarding the offence, and this purpose might be defeated by the 
participation of his solicitor.”19  8
8
16 Thomson Committee, Criminal Procedure in Scotland: Second Report (Cmnd.6218: October 
1975).
17 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, Part 1, ss.2(2), 3(4).
18 Para.2.03.
19 Para.7.16.
Reflecting upon the Thomson Committee’s recommendation in 2010, Lord Hope 
expressed his resignation that change was inevitable because of the legal seeds that were 
sown thirty years earlier. He stated, “...by preferring to go their own way, those who 
were promoting the legislation that gave effect to the Thomson Committee’s 
recommendations were shutting their eyes to the way thinking elsewhere was 
developing”, and that ‘now, sadly, 30 years on, the Scottish criminal justice system must 
reap the consequences’.20
The consequences referred to by Lord Hope stemmed from a statutory procedure that 
allowed police in Scotland to detain and question a person suspected of a crime for a 
duration of up  to six hours prior to arrest and/or release with no right to legal assistance 
during that time. This, as referred to above, was as a result of the Thomson Committee’s 
recommendations. Thus the position pre-Cadder was that  enacted by way of the 
Criminal Justice Scotland) Act 1980 and subsequently the Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1995. Section 14(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act provided 
that a suspect could be detained for a maximum six hours. Section 15(1) provided that a 
detained suspect should be informed that he is entitled to have the fact of his detention 
intimated to a solicitor and one other person. However, in line with the Thomson 
Committee’s recommendations, a detained suspect had no right of access to a solicitor 
aside from this. Little could the members of the Thomson Committee sitting in 
Edinburgh in 1975 imagine that  their recommendations would have such far reaching 
and significant implications on the very nature of Scots criminal procedure.
2.3 The early Scottish cases challenging section 14
A number of Scottish cases pre-Cadder challenged the ECHR compatibility of section 
14 of the Act. The first of these was HM Advocate v Robb.21 Robb raised a devolution 
minute to argue that the use of a statement obtained from him when no legal 
representative was present to provide him with advice during his interview, despite his 
persistent demands for one at the time, would breach his right to a fair trial under Article 
9
20 Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, per Lord Hope at para.51.
21 2000 J.C. 127.
6 of the Convention. Lord Penrose refused the minute stating that the matter of fairness 
must be considered in its entirety, something that  would only  become possible when the 
court was made aware of all evidence during the course of the trial.22
Later that year in Paton v Ritchie,23  the issue arose again. Similar to the decision in 
Robb, Lords Cullen, Sutherland and Dawson held that the matter of fairness depended 
on the trial as a whole, and was not just to be determined on the basis of a lack of legal 
assistance. However, they  went further than the decision in Robb, by making clear that 
Article 6 of the Convention did not create a universal right of access to legal advice 
before or during examination by police,24 as existing safeguards are already  in place.25 
These included the fact that in Scotland no adverse inference could be drawn from the 
fact that  an accused person was silent when he was questioned by  the police26 and the 
fact that the absence of a caution informing the suspect of his or her right to silence is 
likely to put in doubt the admissibility of anything said in response to a police officer.27 
The final significant challenge was in Dickson v HM Advocate.28  Once again, it was 
claimed that the use of a transcript of an interview at trial would breach Article 6 
because his solicitor had not been present despite repeated requests by Mr Dickson that 
he be present. Lords Cameron, Milligan, Hamilton, Macfadyen and Weir followed 
Robb, ruling that fairness should be determined in the context of the trial as a whole. 
They  stated that the deficiency  of a solicitor’s presence during examination in this case 
should have no effect on the construction of the defence, especially given that the jury 
had been explicitly directed to cast aside any evidence produced during trial that had 
been obtained inequitably.29  They  also clearly expressed their view that  there was no 
10
22 At 132.
23 2000 J.C. 271.
24 At 275.
25 At 275-276
26 Robertson v Maxwell 1951 J.C. 11. This is still the case – see the discussion in chapter three.
27 Paton v Ritchie, at 275.
28 2001 J.C. 203.
29 At para 24.
requirement for a solicitor to be present during a police interview under the Convention 
or Scots law.30 
The Thomson Committee’s advice opposing solicitors being permitted access to a 
suspect in detention and the unsuccessful challenges to s.14 in Robb, Paton v Ritchie 
and Dickson, effectively closed down what little debate there was surrounding a 
suspect’s rights at  this important time for three decades.31 However, on the 29th May 
2001, the scene was being set for a legal case in Turkey that would ultimately  have a 
revolutionary effect upon Scots criminal procedure. 
2.4 The Salduz decision 
The case in question was Salduz v Turkey.32 The facts of the case have been described in 
detail elsewhere,33 but effectively concerned the complaint of a young Turkish man that 
the failure to provide him with access to legal assistance while he was detained in 
custody violated his rights under Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR.  
The Grand Chamber in Salduz delivered what was a clear and unequivocal verdict. In a 
unanimous decision,34  it held that suspects should be afforded the right to legal 
representation, “...as a rule, unless it was demonstrated in the light of the particular 
circumstances of each case that there were compelling reasons to restrict this right”.35 
The leading judgement continued:36
11
30 At 217.
31 The cases attracted no notable academic criticism at the time. 
32 (2009) 49 EHRR 19.
33 See e.g. C Shead, “The decision in Salduz” 2009 SCL 680; A Ashworth, “Salduz v 
Turkey” [2010] Crim LR 419.
34 Although the ruling was a unanimous one, there were two separate judgements in the case. 
Judge Bratza issued a judgement in which he agreed with the general principle but suggested 
that the timing at which the right arises be earlier. This is of no significance for the purposes of 
this thesis. 
35 Para 55.
36 Ibid.
“The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably  prejudiced when 
incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a 
lawyer are used for a conviction”.
Salduz was not the only relevant ECtHR judgement issued prior to Cadder in which the 
court expressed its view that suspects must be offered legal assistance prior to charge. 
Indeed, in his speech in Cadder, Lord Hope lists several cases in which the court had 
made similar pronouncements.37 However, it was the catalyst that effectively exposed 
the difference between member states in Europe. It brought into sharp contrast the fact 
that legal assistance as a right was still not available in Scotland to suspects detained for 
police questioning. This left the seemingly  solid and well established practice of 
criminal justice procedure in Scotland exposed to accusations of injustice and there was 
speculation that changes would need to be made to Scottish criminal procedure as a 
result. 
2.5 HM Advocate v McLean
Although the Salduz ruling seemed crystal clear in both its message and intent, the High 
Court of Justiciary showed that they  were not ready to follow the ECtHR just yet. The 
first Scottish case to arise post-Salduz was HM Advocate v McLean.38  In McLean, 
following the lodging of a devolution minute, the suspect  argued that Article 6 would be 
breached should a police interview he gave without his solicitor present be led in 
evidence. The court (a Full Bench convened specifically  for the possibility that earlier 
cases such as Dickson would have to be overruled) disagreed. 
This time a wholesale judicial justification was laid out for the fairness of Scots law as 
it then stood, delivered by Lord Justice General Hamilton. The High Court of Justiciary 
demonstrated its intention to steadfastly adhere to the belief that the protections 
12
37 He notes e.g. Yildiz v Turkey (App no 4661/02)) ECHR 3rd February 2009; Amutgan v Turkey 
(App no 5138/04) ECHR 3rd February 2009; Plonka v Poland (App no 20310/02) ECHR 31st 
March 2009; Pishchalnikov v Russia (App no 7025/04) ECHR 24th September 2009; Dayanan v 
Turkey (App no 7377/03) ECHR 13th October 2009; Tunç v Turkey (App no 20400/03) ECHR 
21st February 2008. 
38 [2009] HCJAC 97. For a more substantial discussion of the case, see F. Leverick, “The right 
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available under Scottish procedure were in-line with Article 6 and robust enough, even 
following the Grand Chamber’s unequivocal ruling in Salduz. Their Lordships affirmed 
that not only  should the fairness of a trial be assessed according to the specific 
circumstances of the case and treatment of the accused,39  but that  Article 6 of the 
Convention is not violated by the absence of a solicitor pre-charge as there are other 
measures in place to secure the trial’s fairness.40  Their Lordships listed these in detail 
and they included: the fact that prior to an accused being questioned, he must be 
cautioned that he need not answer any questions; the fact that interviews with suspects 
are routinely  tape recorded; the fact that no adverse inferences can be drawn from a 
suspect’s failure to answer questions; the existence of the requirement for corroboration; 
and the inadmissibility  of incriminating answers made as a result of coercion.41 Lastly, 
their Lordships argued that section 2(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 directs that 
while ECtHR judgements must  be considered, they are not binding.42 It advocated that 
even if it  was the clear decision and outcome of the Grand Chamber’s ruling that any 
statement given by a suspect be inadmissible unless access to legal assistance, it:43 
“...cannot and should not be applied without qualification in this jurisdiction. In 
particular, if other safeguards to secure a fair trial of the kind which we have 
described are in place, there is, notwithstanding that a lawyer is not so 
provided, no violation, in our view, of Article 6”.
2.6 Cadder v HM Advocate
On Tuesday 26th October 2010, the UK Supreme Court delivered a body blow to 
Scottish Criminal law and jurisprudence when it issued its judgement in the case of 
Cadder v HM Advocate.44 As with Salduz, the precise facts of the case need not concern 
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us here. Essentially, Mr Cadder declined to have a solicitor notified of his detention45 
and, following a period of police examination, made various deleterious admissions. He 
was convicted and subsequently claimed that the Crown’s reliance on these admissions 
at trial breached Article 6 of the ECHR.46 The claim was refused by the High Court but 
was ultimately  determined by the UK Supreme Court, under the procedure governing 
devolution issue appeals.47
The seven Justices of the Supreme Court were united in agreement that the law in 
Scotland was incompatible with Article 6 of the ECHR, in allowing a suspect to be 
detained and questioned by police without having access to legal advice. In effect, the 
Supreme Court ruled that given the decision by  the European Court in Salduz, the 
judgement delivered in McLean was no longer good law. In justifying its conclusions, 
The Supreme Court held that although the decision taken by the High Court of 
Justiciary in McLean was completely in keeping with previous domestic authority, post 
Salduz, it could not survive. The ECtHR ruling in Salduz requires that a detainee must 
be offered access to a lawyer at the point of detention, unless significant reasons exist to 
the contrary to restrict this right. Lord Rodger observed:
“The procedure under sections 14 and 15 of the 1995 Act is therefore, in this 
respect, the very converse of what the Grand Chamber holds is required by 
article 6(1) and (3)(c) of the Convention...Moreover, the Grand Chamber long 
since declared that the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself, 
are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the 
notion of a fair procedure under article 6...A right of access to a lawyer, which 
is implied in order to protect a right at the heart of a fair procedure under article 
6, must itself lie near that heart. For this reason, in my view there is not the 
remotest chance that the European Court would find that, because of the other 
protections that Scots law provides for the accused persons, it  is compatible 
with article 6(1) and (3)(c) for the Scottish system to omit this safeguard...and 
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for suspects to be routinely questioned without having the right to consult a 
lawyer first. On this matter Strasbourg has spoken: the courts in this country 
have no real option but to apply the law which it has laid down.”48
As a consequence of Salduz and Cadder, then, ss.14 and 15 of the 1995 Act now found 
themselves diametrically opposed to Article 6 of the ECHR. 
2.7 The emergency legislation
The government’s response to Cadder was swift. Less than 24 hours after the Justices of 
the Supreme Court had delivered their ruling, Scotland had passed the Criminal 
Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010. This 
hurriedly enacted Bill came into force on 30th October 2010 under emergency 
legislation procedure.49 
The Scottish Cabinet Secretary  for Justice, Kenny MacAskill, stated that the principal 
function of the 2010 Act was to “...bring statute into line with the Supreme Court 
judgement [in Cadder]”.50 The Act introduced a right to a private consultation with a 
solicitor both before any questioning begins and at any other time during questioning.51 
It permits the suspect to have intimation sent to a solicitor for this purpose, and states 
that he must be informed that he has these rights.52 “Consultation” means “consultation 
by such methods as may be appropriate in the circumstances, for example by 
telephone”.53   In exceptional circumstances, the police may delay the exercise of the 
right to consult with a solicitor so far as it  is necessary  in the interest of the 
investigation, the prevention of crime or the apprehension of offenders.54 The maximum 
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time for which a suspect may be detained was extended from six to twelve hours.55 A 
further extension of twelve hours could then be authorised by a “custody review 
officer,” of the rank of inspector or above and unconnected with the investigation, if he 
is satisfied that this is necessary  to secure, obtain or preserve evidence, whether by 
questioning or otherwise, that the offence is an indictable one and that the investigation 
is being conducted diligently and expeditiously.56 
Some of the Act’s measures attracted considerable debate during its passage. Due in part 
to this, the Cabinet Secretary for Justice, Kenny MacAskill MSP, asked the Lord 
President, Lord Hamilton, to nominate a senior High Court judge to lead an independent 
review of Scottish criminal law and practice in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Cadder. On the 26th October Lord Hamilton selected Lord Carloway, now Lord 
Justice Clerk, to head the review, which began in November of 2010. Lord Carloway 
was supported by a full-time Review team and assisted by a Reference Group which 
was made up of leading practitioners and academics. 
2.8 The Carloway Review and subsequent developments
Lord Carloway reported in November 2011.57 He described his review as an opportunity 
for Scotland’s criminal justice system to “...re-cast and modernise aspects of the system 
so [that it] provides a comprehensive, effective and fair criminal justice system for the 
foreseeable future”.58 His terms of reference were: 
(i) To review the law and practice of questioning suspects in a criminal 
investigation in Scotland in light of the recent decisions by the UK Supreme 
Court and the ECtHR, and with reference to law and practice in other 
jurisdictions; (ii) To consider the implications of the recent decisions, in 
particular the legal advice prior to and during police questioning, and other 
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developments in the operation of detention of suspects since it was introduced 
in Scotland in 1980 on the effective investigation and prosecution of crime; 
(iii) To consider the criminal law of evidence, insofar as there are implications 
arising from (ii) above, in particular the requirement for corroboration and the 
suspect’s right to silence; (iv) To consider the extent to which issues raised 
during the passage of the [2010 Act] may need further consideration, and the 
extent to which the provisions of the Act  may  need amendment or replacement; 
(v) To make recommendations for further changes to the law and to identify 
where further guidance is needed, recognising the rights of the suspect, the 
rights of victims and witnesses and the wider interests of justice while 
maintaining an efficient and effective system for the investigation and 
prosecution of crime.59 
As such, he made 76 recommendations in total across the areas of arrest, detention and 
custody; police questioning and the provision of legal advice; rules of evidence, 
including corroboration; and the reduction of delays in appeals, and the role of the 
Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission. Those relevant to the thesis will be noted 
shortly. Some, as we shall see, are extremely radical, most notably his recommendation 
that the requirement for corroboration in criminal cases be abolished. 
Lord Carloway’s report was followed in July  2012 by a consultation paper, in which the 
Scottish Government set out proposals based on Lord Carloway’s recommendations.60 
The Carloway  review has been criticized procedurally  on the basis that it is 
inappropriate for radical changes to be made to Scottish criminal procedure on the 
recommendation of a single individual.61  While an assessment of this criticism lies 
beyond the scope of this thesis it is worth noting that the Scottish Government’s 
consultation paper made it obvious that it intended to adopt Lord Carloway’s 
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recommendations as a package62  and thus the matters that were open for consultation 
were very limited. The consultation was followed by a further consultation, this time 
specifically on safeguards that might be required if the requirement for corroboration 
was removed.63 Finally, the Government put forward a draft Bill, the Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Bill (CJSB), introduced on 20 June 2013, which enacted the vast majority  of 
Lord Carloway’s recommendations without amendment. Its only  concession to the 
safeguards consultation was to propose that the majority of jurors required for a 
conviction in Scotland was increased from eight to ten.64
Stage 1 consideration of the Bill has been completed by the Justice Committee. This 
culminated with the debate of the Bill in Parliament.65 During the stage 1 consideration, 
there was much criticism of the proposal to abolish the requirement for corroboration 
without putting alternative safeguards against wrongful conviction in place.66  The 
Scottish Government initially pressed on with the Bill stating that it wished to pass the 
legislation, including the section abolishing the corroboration requirement, but with a 
clause providing that this would not be brought into force until appropriate safeguards 
against wrongful conviction had been identified. As such, stage 2 consideration of the 
Bill looked like it would commence and the Government announced that Lord Bonomy 
would undertake a review of appropriate safeguards (the Post Corroboration Safeguards 
Review).67 However, close to the submission of this thesis, at the meeting of the
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Scottish Parliament on 23 April 2014,68  the Government announced that stage 2 
consideration of the Bill would not proceed until the Safeguards Review had reported in 
April 2015. 
The following (and final) section of this chapter examines the main recommendations of 
(a) Lord Carloway  and (b) the CJSB in those areas that are relevant to the argument of 
my thesis, namely the timing of the RLA; the dimensions of the RLA; whether the 
RLA be refused; and whether  the RLA can be waived.
2.9 The relevant legal developments
2.9.1 The timing of the RLA
The first relevant issue relates to the timing of the RLA. Before the 2010 Act, suspects 
could only be detained for a maximum period of six hours and had no right to receive 
legal assistance until they had actually been arrested. Only at this point could they 
request the right to a private meeting with a lawyer before they appeared at their first 
court appearance.69 By way of the provisions introduced in the emergency legislation, a 
suspect now has the right to, “a private consultation with a solicitor” both before and at 
any time during questioning.70 This did leave open the precise point at which the right 
arises. However, the Carloway Review recommended that the fact that a person is being 
asked questions by the police should be the trigger for the RLA to be activated. 
Furthermore, Lord Carloway considered that  a suspect who was being interviewed by 
police outwith a police station was still technically  “at liberty”, and therefore there was 
“no need to require the police to secure access by a suspect  to a lawyer”. 
71Notwithstanding, he recommended that in order to be fully compliant with Article 6 
following ECtHR case law,72  and the European Directive on the Right to Legal 
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Assistance,73 a suspect in this position ought to be informed as part of the police caution 
that he has a right of access to a solicitor. He therefore proposed that  the provisions of 
the 1995 Act,74 introduced by the 2010 Act, require to be amended to provide that such 
access is available, regardless of questioning, as soon as practicable after the detention 
of the arrested suspect at the police station.75  This means the RLA would operate as 
soon as detention commences, rather than being dependent on questioning. The Scottish 
Government followed Lord Carloway’s recommendation. Section 36 of the Bill 
provides for the right of a person in police custody to have a private consultation with a 
solicitor at any time. 
2.9.2 The dimensions of the RLA 
The second issue of relevance is the precise method by which legal assistance is 
delivered. The emergency legislation introduced the right to a “private consultation with 
a solicitor” but then stated that this means “consultation by such means as may be 
appropriate in the circumstances” which can include “consultation by means of 
telephone”.76 It  did not provide for any right for the solicitor to be physically present 
while the suspect was being questioned.
Lord Carloway proposed that subject to the caveat of “reasonable remuneration” in 
legal aid cases, it should be for the suspect to decide whether legal advice should be 
provided in person, or by other means such as by  telephone or internet video link and 
whether he/she requires a solicitor to be present during any interview.77  The CJSB 
essentially  followed his recommendation. Section 24 of the Bill provides for the right of 
a person reasonably suspected of committing an offence to have a solicitor present 
during police interview. It applies to a person who is either in police custody or has 
voluntarily  attended a police station, or other place, for the purpose of being interviewed 
20
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by a constable. It also retains the provision from the emergency legislation that prior to 
a suspect being interviewed there is an entitlement to a private consultation, but that this 
consultation can be by  such means as considered appropriate, for example, by 
telephone.78 
 2.9.3 Can a request for legal assistance be refused?
The next question is whether the police can ever commence questioning if the suspect 
has requested but not yet  received legal assistance. In his review, Lord Carloway 
accepted that the police must be able to delay a suspect’s right of access to a lawyer in 
“exceptional circumstances” and that there is no need for that  expression to be defined 
in statute.79 
Once again, the Scottish Government accepted Lord Carloway’s recommendations 
when drafting the 2013 Bill. Section 24(3) provides that  unless a person has consented 
to be interviewed without a solicitor present, a constable must not  start to interview the 
person about the alleged offence until a solicitor is present and must not deny the 
solicitor access to the person at any time during interview. However, s.24(4) allows a 
constable to interview the person without a solicitor present if satisfied it is necessary to 
interview the person without delay in the interests of the investigation or prevention of 
crime, or the apprehension of offenders. If a solicitor becomes available during such 
time as the police are interviewing a person, the solicitor must be allowed access to that 
person. 
2.9.4 Can the right be waived? 
The emergency legislation did not contain any provisions on waiver of the RLA. Lord 
Carloway did however address this issue. In keeping with the relevant ECHR 
jurisprudence,80  he accepted that waiver of the right of legal assistance should be 
permitted. However, he made specific recommendations for waiver for vulnerable and 
non-vulnerable suspects, children and young adults within this framework as follows:
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(i) Non -vulnerable adults:
Lord Carloway recommended legislation should expressly  provide that adults who are 
not vulnerable may waive the RLA. It should state that waiver must be express and 
recorded. Lord Carloway proposed that the right cannot be waived unless and until the 
person has been fully informed of the right,81  therefore protecting the unintentional 
relinquishing of their RLA. These recommendations have been followed in the Bill, s.
24(6) of which provides that: “Where a person consents to being interviewed without 
having a solicitor present, there must be recorded (a) the time at which the person 
consented, and (b) any reason given by  the person at that time for waiving the right to 
have a solicitor present.”
(ii) Vulnerable adults:
In relation to vulnerable suspects, Lord Carloway recommended that the minimum that 
the statute should provide is the services of an appropriate adult as soon as practicable 
after detention and prior to any questioning. Most pertinently for the purposes of this 
thesis, he recommended that a vulnerable suspect should only be able to waive their 
RLA if the appropriate adult also agrees to this.82 The Scottish Government accepted 
this proposal, and has included it within the provisions of the Bill.83  Lord Carloway 
recognized, however, that determining who may or may not be a vulnerable adult can be 
difficult84 and this is discussed further in chapter four.
(iii) Under 16s:
The most fundamental change in this area Lord Carloway proposed related to children 
under the age of 16 years of age. Lord Carloway recommended that no child under the 
age of 16 years should be able to reject the services of a legal representative, making 
waiver invalid for all children, irrespective of personal circumstances or mental 
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capacity.85  Furthermore, he recommended that no parent, guardian, or other person to 
whom the child is legally entrusted should be able to waive this right on the child’s 
behalf. The Scottish Government has followed Lord Carloway’s proposal and made it 
explicit within the terms of the CJSB that under 16s cannot waive their RLA.86
(iv) 16-17 year olds:
The Carloway Review recommended that where the child is 16 or 17 years they may 
waive their RLA but only with the agreement of a parent, carer or responsible person.87 
The Scottish Government considered making the provision of legal advice mandatory to 
all under eighteens. However, it decided that it was important to distinguish between the 
different needs, stages of development and potential circumstances of older and younger 
children. Therefore, “while it might appear attractive to treat all individuals under 18 
years consistently, the age-based laws which allow for seventeen year olds to be living 
independently and married reflect the quite different contexts and degrees of self-
determination that can exist  between a 10 and a 17 year old”.88  The Scottish 
Government therefore followed Lord Carloway’s recommendation regarding this and 
the Bill provides that 16 and 17 year olds can agree to be interviewed by police without 
a solicitor only if a “relevant person” (parent, carer etc) agrees.89 
2.9.5 The maximum time of detention pre-charge
Following the amendments made by the 2010 Act in the wake of Cadder, the length of 
time a suspect could be detained and questioned by police prior to charge was extended 
to a maximum period of 12 hours at first instance, with a further 12 hours being 
authorised with the approval of a custody review officer.90  Lord Carloway 
recommended that the maximum period for questioning be 12 hours (with a requirement 
for review after the first  six hours), and that no extension be permitted.91 Lord Carloway 
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states in his Report that,“[h]aving regard to all the circumstances, and the absence of 
significant criticism of the operation of the 2010 Act as a generality, a period of twelve 
hours is reasonable”,92 for a suspect to be detained pre-charge. Lord Carloway justifies 
this timescale on the basis that modern investigative tools and the effect of Cadder 
necessitate a longer detention period than the original 6 hours previously permitted for 
questioning and initial investigation.93 Lord Carloway said that he was “influenced” by 
the relatively low number of cases in which an increase in the current time scale 
introduced by the 2010 Act had actually been required.94 The CJSB has followed Lord 
Carloway’s recommendation.95
2.9.6 Corroboration
By far the most radical proposal is the abolition of the requirement for corroboration, 
the requirement that the essential facts of a case must be proven by evidence from two 
separate sources, a principle of iconic status in Scots law. The proposal to remove the 
requirement for corroboration plays a central role in my argument, which is that 
contrary to the intention of the Supreme Court, suspects may end up  being less well 
protected following Cadder than they were under the previous regime. Lord Carloway 
believes corroboration should be entirely abolished for all categories of crime, 
recommending that it has no place in a contemporary  legal system where judges and 
juries should be free to consider all relevant evidence and answer the single question of 
whether they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person committed 
the offence libelled.96 
Despite the opposition of many of those in the judiciary, legal profession and the Law 
Commission, the government accepted Lord Carloway’s controversial proposal. As 
such, section 57 of the Bill provides that  “subject to the conditions set out in sections 58 
and 59, where a fact has been established by evidence in any criminal proceedings, the 
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judge or jury  is entitled to find the fact proved by the evidence although the evidence is 
not corroborated”. 
2.9.7 Right to silence
Finally, Lord Carloway examined the issue of the right to silence (RTS). At present, 
Scots law recognises an extensive RTS for detained suspects. They  do not have to 
provide any information other than basic identity  details of name, address, date, place of 
birth and nationality.97 Crucially for the suspect, no adverse inferences can be drawn 
from a failure to answer police questions,98 although any answers they may choose to 
give remain admissible. Lord Carloway  recommends that this position be maintained as 
adverse inference provisions would “not fit  well with the presumption of innocence, the 
right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination...instead of promoting 
efficiency and effectiveness, it  would bring unnecessary  complexity to the criminal 
justice system”.99  The CJSB likewise contains no provisions that would change this 
position. 
2.10 Summary of chapter 2
This chapter has been concerned with setting out the background to the introduction of a 
RLA in Scots law and with setting out the changes that (assuming the CJSB is passed in 
its present form) that  will be made to Scottish criminal procedure in the wake of the 
introduction of this right. The main developments of note concern the proposed 
dimensions of the RLA (which include a provision that a suspect is entitled to the 
physical presence of a solicitor when he is being questioned); some radical provisions 
on waiver of the RLA; the changes made to the maximum time period for which a 
suspect can be detained without charge; the abolition of the requirement for 
corroboration; and the decision not to introduce adverse inference provisions. The 
implications of all of these changes will be considered in chapters three and four, which 
will assess the extent to which these changes leave suspects better protected in a number 
of key areas than they were prior to Cadder.
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CHAPTER THREE
 ARE SUSPECTS BETTER PROTECTED?
3.1 Introduction
The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the extent to which suspects are left better 
protected by the changes in the law that have occurred post-Cadder in Scotland. In 
order to address this aim, it is necessary to identify what it is that we are trying to 
protect suspects from. In doing so, it is useful to refer to the existing literature on the 
protections that legal assistance might offer to suspects. It has been suggested that there 
are four main justifications for the right to legal assistance (RLA) at the pre-trial stage. 
On the assumption that the suspect has taken up the RLA,1 the various protections that 
might be offered are (i) protection from ill treatment; (ii) prevention of emotional 
distress; (iii) assisting suspects in understanding and implementing the right to silence 
(RTS); and (iv) safeguarding against wrongful conviction.2  In this chapter I will take 
each of these in turn and will address four questions: (a) from what is it that  we wish to 
protect suspects and why is it important? (b) how well were suspects protected prior to 
Cadder? (c) how (if at all) has the introduction of a RLA improved protection? and (d) 
have the post-Cadder changes reduced protection in any respect?  In the following 
chapter, I will conclude whether or not, on balance, in each of these respects suspects 
are left better protected in the post-Cadder regime taking into account the additional 
concern that a significant proportion of suspects are likely to waive their RLA. As stated 
in chapter 1, the assessment will be undertaken on the assumption that the provisions of 
the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill (CJSB) subsequently come into force.
3.2 Preventing ill treatment
a) What is it the suspect should be protected against in respect of ill treatment?
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One area in which the RLA might protect suspects is by providing them with protection 
from ill treatment during the time they are in police detention.3 Two distinct types of ill 
treatment may arise. Firstly, there are those that are unrelated to the interview room and 
encompass the general conditions which physical detention brings, such as the size and 
comfort of the cell, the provision of food and drink and so on. Secondly, there are those 
relating to the contact  that the suspect has with police officers (or others concerned with 
his detention). There is potential for ill-treatment here both inside and outside the 
interview room and it may encompass either physical violence or, more likely, 
psychologically coercive techniques. 
The concern that physical violence will be used during (or outside) police questioning is 
discussed by Walkley, who found that half of all police officers he interviewed admitted 
feeling what one officer encapsulated. The police officer said, “Some suspects expect 
rough treatment in the police station and, if it suits the circumstances, I don’t do 
anything to allay their fears”.4 Walkley was, however, writing in the 1980s and it has to 
be said though that this is perhaps less of a concern in the modern era. 
Of more concern is perhaps the use of other more subtle coercive tactics. Tactics 
including isolation, lengthy durations of interrogation, maximization and minimization 
of the seriousness of the alleged offence, the tendering of invented evidence, inferred as 
well as unambiguous threats of punishment or assurances of leniency, all are in the 
arsenal of an interviewer intent  on the manipulation of a suspect to provoke a 
confession.5  In practice, the interrogation room can be imbued with an atmosphere of 
implied violence and physical coercion, none of which would be permitted in the 
courtroom context.6 A case that serves as an example of the type of tactics we might be 
concerned about here is Codona v. H.M. Advocate,7 where the Appeal Court  quashed the 
murder conviction of a fourteen-year-old girl on the basis that her confession should 
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never have been admitted as evidence. The police repeatedly asked the appellant if she 
had kicked the deceased, despite her repeated denials, at a time when she was crying 
and distressed. The interview lasted for two and a half hours. The court  stated that, 
“...their [the police officers] questioning was of such a character as to demonstrate an 
intention on their part to extract from her admissions about her participation in the 
assault which she clearly was not willing to make voluntarily. Of particular concern in 
this case is the length of the interview.”8 
As in the case of physical violence, however, it does have to be questioned whether 
such tactics are used to the same extent today. Recent research suggests that they are 
very rare. Soukara et al, in an extensive study of this issue, found that, “coercive tactics 
were used very infrequently”.9  Soukara’s research was undertaken in England and 
Wales but there is no reason to think that things are any different in the Scottish context. 
Nonetheless, however ‘very  infrequently’ ill treatment occurs now, it does not mean that 
one should not be concerned about it, for when ill treatment does take place its impact  is 
great both on the suspect himself and on the integrity of the criminal justice process. 
b) What measures existed for suspects pre-Cadder to help protect them against ill 
treatment?
Prior to the post-Cadder reforms, there were no specific measures to check the 
conditions in which detained suspects were being held, or at least no independent ones 
(aside that is from any general inspections of police facilities carried out by independent 
bodies such as Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland). The suspect 
had the right to notify one person and a solicitor that he was being held, but no more 
than these rights as they stood under sections 14 and 15 of the unamended CP(Sc)A 
1995. He had no right for anyone to be present with him while being questioned, and 
any protection against ill-treatment prior to Cadder was therefore reliant on the police 
officers involved in the detention process regulating themselves and their supervisors 
keeping an eye on the tactics used by  junior officers. However, there were some 
protections from violent and coercive tactics being used during interview, the main one 
being that  interviews were (and still are) routinely  audio-recorded. As Leverick notes, 
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modern technology, such as the recording of police interviews, can go some way  to 
mitigating the extent of abuse which might take place. This must be tempered, however, 
as Leverick states:10
“On the other hand, this still leaves the possibility of other coercive pressures 
being applied. Tape recording is an ineffective means of safeguarding against 
this as it  does not capture facial or bodily gestures and only captures events that 
occur while the recorder is running”.
So although by no means fool-proof, it would appear that interviews being tape 
recorded goes some way  to alleviate potential abuse concerns and to reduce the capacity 
for abuse to arise between suspect and examiners during interrogation.    
A second area in which protection already existed is that any  confessions secured by 
violence or coercion would be inadmissible. Two possible tests existed for determining 
the admissibility of statements by  a suspect in response to police questioning: Firstly, 
the common law route which has established rules to protect a suspect from physical, 
emotional, mental coercion, or oppressive conduct on the part of the authorities. Here 
confessions will only  be admitted as evidence if the court is satisfied that they have 
been fairly obtained.11  
Secondly, there is the safety net catch all of the Convention assessing whether the 
suspect’s Article 6 right to a fair trial has been contravened.12 We can conclude then that 
prior to Cadder although there were general protections in place, these were protections 
that would become operational mainly at the trial stage and certainly post detention 
interrogation i.e. at the point when the court would be asked to consider whether or not 
any statement made by a suspect is admissible as evidence against him or whether 
overall the accused’s trial was fair. It  might be said that  a likely  knock-on effect of this 
would be that  police officers would be less likely to use coercive tactics during an 
interview because if they  did so, any evidence they obtained would most likely be 
unusable so their tactics would be pointless. However, such protection operates only in 
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an indirect  manner and only applies to ill-treatment in the narrow confines of the 
interview room. Very little protection actually  therefore existed for suspects in terms of 
checking on and preventing ill treatment during the period of detention more widely. 
c) Has the introduction of a RLA helped to improve the protection available to suspects 
in respects of the prevention of ill treatment? 
The next question is whether the introduction of the RLA has improved the position of 
suspects in respect of their protection from ill-treatment. In theory, the RLA certainly 
has the potential to improve matters in this respect. A solicitor can utilise his role to 
ensure that police officers do not cross a line which would be considered to be ill-
treating his client and to act as a witness should such an abuse of authority arise.13 If the 
suspect has someone physically present from the outset of the interrogation and 
throughout its duration such potential abuse, whether it be physical or through 
emotional and mental coercion, would be safeguarded against and the risk diminished. 
According to the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, effective legal 
assistance advice requires a solicitor’s presence at  interrogation to address this very 
concern.14  Furthermore, a solicitor may act as an independent and objective witness to 
any ill-treatment that does occur. As Dixon states, “[a] legal advisor can effectively  be 
used as a witness of an interrogation. His or her presence will make it difficult to 
successfully  make allegations of maltreatment or to challenge the accuracy of any 
confession”.15  
All of this is however subject to at least one caveat, which is that there is some evidence 
from England and Wales that legal advisers tend to take a very passive role in 
interviews and are not as effective in preventing hostile or coercive questioning as one 
might expect. Baldwin, in a study of legal practices undertaken in the 1990s for the 
Royal Commission in England and Wales, concluded that:16
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“I was very much struck by the extreme passivity of most of the legal advisers 
who featured in the 182 interviews that I examined. I came across many 
examples of legal advisers remaining silent when questioning was very 
persistent, harrying or confusing, when officers were rude to suspects, or where 
they  were clearly operating on the basis of crude assumptions of guilt  from the 
outset. [It] was easy for me to list examples of cases in which I took the view 
that a reasonably  competent legal adviser ought to have intervened . . . Taking 
the 182 cases together, two-thirds of legal advisers said nothing at  all in 
interviews and, when they intervened to any significant extent, it was almost as 
often to help the police interviewers as it was to assist their clients.” 
This study was undertaken some time ago and in the context of England and Wales and 
may be of limited application to the current Scottish context but it is a point  worth 
making that this protection is only going to arise if solicitors are active in challenging 
any ill-treatment or more subtle coercion that arises during the interview. 
To summarise, then, although by no means foolproof it would appear that any type of 
“surveillance” which acts as an independent witness will reduce the likelihood for abuse 
to arise between suspect and examiners during interrogation should the suspect utilize 
their RLA. Given that section 24 of the CJSB provides for the right of a person in police 
custody to have a solicitor present when being questioned by police, we can conclude 
then that the introduction of a RLA has improved the protection available for suspects in 
a significant respect as any suspect who requests it can now have a solicitor present in 
the interview room. 
It can also be said that protection outside of the confines of the interview room has 
improved, at  least in comparison to the protection that existed previously. Under section 
36(1) of the CJSB a suspect is entitled to a private consultation with a solicitor. This is 
not dependent on questioning and can act as a more general check on such things as the 
conditions of detention and the physical condition of a suspect. It is however, subject to 
two important limitations. First, it does rely  on a legal adviser actually  attending at the 
police station. It would be extremely difficult for a legal adviser to check the conditions 
in which is a suspect is being held by telephone. If a video link is set up, it might be 
possible to check the physical condition of the suspect, but again this is not the ideal 
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way for physical condition to be examined. Notably, the CJSB does not provide a right 
for the consultation with a solicitor to be face to face (or at least not until the point of 
the interview itself, when the suspect does have the right to have a solicitor physically 
present under section 24 of the Bill). Up until this point, the Bill states that consultation, 
“means consultation by such as may be appropriate in the circumstances and includes 
(for example) consultation by means of telephone”,17 which does limit the role that a 
solicitor can play. Second, even if a solicitor does attend at the police station, he is not 
(aside from exceptional circumstances) going to be able to do so immediately, which 
does leave some scope for ill-treatment occurring undetected before he arrives. Even 
given these limitations, however, it is the case that the RLA does add some additional 
protection to suspects in respect of possible ill-treatment during detention. 
d) Have any post-Cadder changes decreased the level of protection afforded to suspects 
in respect of ill treatment?
The next question to be addressed is whether any of the measures contained in the CJSB 
have worsened the degree of protection. There is nothing in the Bill which directly 
reduces the level of protection against ill treatment. There is, however, one provision 
that indirectly places the suspect in a worse position and that  relates to the maximum 
length of detention. Given that the CJSB has extended the time limit for detention from 
six to 12 hours18 – twice as long as the original length of detention permitted under s.14 
of the CPSA – this facilitates the police in putting further pressure on the detained, and 
possibly psychologically  stressed, suspect. This was introduced in part to allow extra 
time for a solicitor to arrive should his presence be requested. However in its response 
to The Carloway Review Consultation, the Law Society of Scotland states that, “...there 
is no evidence to suggest that such delays would occur, only speculation and what 
evidence we have now suggests that  such delays are rare”,19 as regards solicitors not 
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being able to attend within the six hour period.20  Whether the doubling of detention 
times under the CJSB was intended to allow sufficient time to provide legal assistance 
or to give the police longer to carry out inquiries, either way it  will result in a suspect 
being potentially held in detention for longer, bringing with it all the above associated 
concerns. 
 In this section, we have seen then that the prevention of ill-treatment during detention is 
a concern (albeit perhaps not such a major concern as it  would have been historically) 
and that we are concerned here with both the general conditions of detention and with 
any physical or psychological pressure placed on suspects during police questioning. 
Prior to Cadder, there was little direct protection in existence. There were no 
independent checks on detention conditions in which individual suspects were being 
held, nor on the police interview process. It was the case that ill-treatment may have 
been deterred by the fact that a confession obtained unfairly would be inadmissible but 
this was very much an indirect protection, even if it might have had some deterrent 
effect. The introduction of the RLA has improved matters – a solicitor can check the 
conditions in which a suspect is being detained, can act as a deterrent to coercive tactics 
during questioning and can act as a witness to any ill-treatment of this nature that does 
occur. He can also step in and actively object to any inappropriate tactics, although this 
does depend on him being willing to do so. Balanced against this is the fact that the 
overall maximum length of time of detention permitted has been increased, so the 
period in which a suspect might potentially be ill-treated is now longer.
This assessment will be re-visited in chapter four, where the issue of the take up of legal 
assistance will be added into the analysis. For now, this chapter moves on to the second 
issue – that of the prevention of emotional distress.
3.3 Prevention of emotional distress
a) What is it the suspect should be protected against in respect of emotional distress?
A second possible way in which the RLA might protect suspects is by preventing 
emotional distress. In his speech in Cadder, Lord Rodger suggested that the provision of 
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emotional support to suspects was an important justification of the RLA. He stated that 
“[a] right to legal advice...could be derived from the need for legal assistance...for 
example, to support the accused in distress”.21  Thus, providing emotional support to a 
suspect may be considered one important role played by  the RLA.22 As Skinns suggests, 
detention can be a frightening, distressing, unpredictable and alienating place, especially 
for those who are being held for the first time. She presents a picture of the exposed and 
isolated individual in custody by stating that:23
 “...police custody areas are pressured environments and detainees, who often 
have complex needs, bear the brunt of long periods in stark conditions (e.g. in 
solitary confinement) contemplating the uncertainties of what lies ahead. 
Undoubtedly, this must be frightening, especially  for the inexperienced or the 
vulnerable”.
The first experience and period of detention is likely to have the most impact on those 
detained, especially so if they have no warning of their arrest. Detention can be 
traumatic, particularly if people have no time to plan and to make emergency 
arrangements relating to child-care and or work activities.24  Choongh found in one 
study of those detained in custody that one-fifth found the experience “intolerable”, and 
over half found it “distressing”, describing their emotions at the time as “angry”, 
“powerless” and “trapped”.25 
If the emotional distress caused to detained suspects is a general concern, it is even 
more of a concern where the suspect is vulnerable due to advancing age; mental 
disorder or disability; a complication in understanding English; or a hearing or speech 
impairment. This is a pertinent issue as research has shown that psychological 
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vulnerability is extremely  prevalent in detained suspects. Recent research undertaken by 
Herrington and Roberts shows that there exists a prevalent  psychological vulnerability 
in the population of adult suspects and that:26
“There are cognitive challenges facing individuals with a mental illness or 
intellectual disability. Such vulnerabilities can place individuals at a 
disadvantage during social interactions in general, and with the police in 
particular.”
The underlying psychological vulnerability of those detained at  a police station is 
supported by  Finn et al. They found that as many as 80 per cent of those who were part 
of an arrest referral link worker scheme required psychiatric treatment to combat a 
serious mental health problem.27 Furthermore, according to Barron et al. 45 per cent of 
all suspects detained have some form of learning difficulties whilst 40 per cent will 
have been through special needs schooling.28 When one considers the findings from the 
Office of National Statistics which suggest that 25 per cent of the population experience 
some form of mental illness each year,29  the  potential magnitude of Herrington and 
Roberts’ findings suggesting an underlying prevalent psychological vulnerability 
becomes apparent and must be taken seriously. Although this research does all stem 
from England and Wales, there is no reason to think that the make-up  of the Scottish 
suspect population is any different.
Furthermore, given that mental health problems appear comparatively frequently 
amongst juvenile suspects, occurring on average at least three times more in young 
people within the youth criminal justice system than in the general population of young 
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people,30  the potential emotional distress caused to vulnerable child suspects is even 
more of a concern. To put this in perspective, it has been suggested that  over 60 per cent 
of children who offend have communication problems, and of this group about half 
have poor or very  poor communication skills. Approximately a quarter of children who 
offend have IQs of less than 70 and a further 30 per cent have borderline learning 
difficulties.31 Although these figures stem from England and Wales, once again there is 
no reason to think they  do not apply to Scotland and thus it  quickly becomes apparent 
that emotional support will be essential to a vulnerable child suspect.
The reality of the experience of detention, then, is that it is likely to put any one of us at 
some risk, although there are particular increased risks that adults and children with 
mental health problems may be more likely to face compared to that of the general 
population. The first is the impact on their mental health of being in custody. In addition 
to the stress of being arrested, there is the bleak nature of the environment in which one 
is held, given that conditions in cells are very basic. There may also be additional 
stresses, for example, if an individual is deemed at risk of self-harm or suicide, as they 
may have their clothes removed and alternative clothing given. Furthermore, the work 
of Gudjonsson and Mackeith demonstrates that those who are psychologically 
vulnerable or suffering from mental illness can give unreliable testimony including false 
confessions.32 
We can conclude then that  the detained suspect faces a number of potential challenges 
when trying to protect himself against emotional distress. He faces not only physical 
challenges in relation to his immediate surroundings, but there also exist concerns 
regarding the mental welfare of the suspect in relation to his time spent in detention and 
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the potential for ill treatment that such an environment may provide during interrogation 
and detention itself. Emotional distress in the form of isolation, fear and uncertainty are 
all possible reactions a suspect may experience during detention. Clear decision making 
becomes all the more difficult for the distressed suspect in such a position. It is 
therefore very important that steps are taken to protect such individuals in custody by 
providing emotional support at this stage. 
b) What measures existed for suspects pre-Cadder to help protect them against 
emotional distress?
As chapter 2 outlined, prior to Cadder, a suspect was entitled to have intimation of the 
arrest or detention and the location of the police station sent to a solicitor and one other 
reasonably named person, but  no right to actually  consult a solicitor.33 This would do 
little to reduce a suspect’s emotional distress. It may  be that emotional support would 
have been provided by  other people, but it  is difficult to see who would do that other 
than the police, who are not an obvious source of emotional support in a custodial 
setting. 
Vulnerable suspects fared better as they  were entitled to the access of an ‘appropriate 
person’. The detention of a child suspect had to be intimated to his or her parent or other 
responsible person in whose care the child rests.34 However, the appropriate adult was 
subject to, “any restrictions required for the purposes of investigation”,35 and could only 
be present in a capacity  to emotionally comfort and assist in communication, not to 
advise on matters of law or that of the child suspect’s defence. For the purposes of a 
vulnerable adult suspect, pre-Cadder Scottish Government guidance stated that an 
appropriate professional adult was required, “...to facilitate communication between a 
mentally disordered person and the police and, as far as is possible, ensure 
understanding by both parties”.36  However, as in the case of a child suspect, the 
parameters are clearly set out and limited. The guidance states:37
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“The presence of the appropriate adult is about trying to ensure equality  for the 
person being interviewed. It is not  about advocacy or speaking on behalf of a 
person with a mental disorder, rather it is about an independent third party 
checking that effective communication is taking place and that the person being 
interviewed is not disadvantaged in any way due to their mental disorder”.
We can conclude then that, prior to Cadder, although vulnerable suspects had at least 
some emotional assistance and support available to them by way of access to an 
appropriate adult, very little protection existed for those suspects who were not deemed 
vulnerable in terms of preventing emotional distress or providing emotional support at a 
time of acute vulnerability, stress and uncertainty. The one thing that could be said, 
however, was that the maximum detention time permitted under the law as it stood prior 
to Cadder was very short, at  six hours, which did go at least some way to mitigating the 
lack of support available.
c) Has the introduction of a RLA helped to improve the protection available to suspects 
in respect of the prevention of emotional distress?
The benefit a legal adviser might bring is to potentially reduce some of the distress a 
suspect experiences in custody. It might also possibly provide comfort to a detainee’s 
family about the state of their loved one’s welfare. It may be that the suspect takes 
added emotional confidence and therefore psychological comfort from the fact that a 
lawyer, who has the pre-requisite legal knowledge to aid his case and offer advice, is 
present. 
Section 36 of the CJSB provides for the right of a person in police custody to have a 
private consultation with a solicitor at any time.  This means the RLA operates as soon 
as detention commences, rather than being dependent on questioning. One might 
question how much support a lawyer is able to give. He is not a trained counsellor, after 
all, and one might therefore question whether a lawyer is necessary to serve this 
purpose. But compared to the situation prior to Cadder it  is an improvement in that 
there is now at least someone on whom all suspects can call for emotional support in 
custody.
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We can conclude then that  the introduction of a RLA has improved the protection 
available for suspects in respects of helping to prevent emotional distress from 
occurring. The suspect can now request legal assistance, and should they do this a 
legally  qualified source of assistance will be available to suspects from the point at 
which a solicitor is able to arrive. As was discussed in relation to the prevention of ill-
treatment, however, there are two limitations to the support  a solicitor will be able to 
provide. The first  is that, unlesss the solicitor is already on-site at the police station, 
there will, inevitably, be a period of time where the suspect is left unsupported while he 
awaits the arrival of his solicitor. The length of this period of time will vary, depending 
on factors such as the geographical location of the police station and the time of day  at 
which he awaits the arrival of his solicitor. The second is that  there is no guarantee in 
the Bill that assistance will be provided in person. The Bill only creates a right to a 
private consultation and does not guarantee that this will take place face to face, or at 
least not until the point at which the suspect is actually interviewed (when he acquires a 
right to have a solicitor present during that interview).38  The emotional support that 
could be provided by  telephone may be limited compared to the reassurance that could 
be provided face to face.39
d) Have any post-Cadder changes decreased the level of protection afforded to suspects 
in respect of emotional distress?
The next question is whether any of the post-Cadder changes have impacted negatively 
on the degree of emotional distress that is likely to be experienced by suspects. Before 
the 2010 Act, suspects could only be detained for a maximum period of six hours 
Following the 2010 Act, the maximum period for which suspects could be detained was 
increased to 24 hours,40 although under the CJSB this was reduced to twelve hours.41 So 
although has the CJSB added the right to consult a solicitor at the detention stage, it has 
also extended the time limit for detention from six to twelve hours. This is still twice as 
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long as the original length of detention and makes the position for suspects considerably 
worse in this regard. 
Even if the law has changed to allow a suspect to be detained for a maximum of 24 
hours (or twelve if the CJSB is passed), this would not necessarily leave suspects in a 
worse position if the additional time was not being used in practice. However, figures 
collected by Lord Carloway from the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland 
(ACPOS) show that in the period from the introduction of the emergency legislation to 
the time of his Report’s writing in November 2011, 15.7 per cent of cases of detention 
exceeded the six hours that was originally permitted prior to Cadder.42 Lord Carloway 
concludes that, “[i]f this pattern persists, this would relate to more than 5,500 detentions 
every  year”.43 Furthermore, although according to the ACPOS data, “less than half of 
one per cent of detentions has involved an extension beyond the twelve hour initial 
maximum”,44 this translates to 350 suspects a year or roughly  one a day. Looked at in 
that context, it is a sizable number.
We can conclude then that in some respects the changes that  have occurred subsequent 
to Cadder have left the suspect worse off than he was previously. As the suspect must 
now endure a doubling of the time he can be held in detention, the opportunity for 
emotional distress is that much greater. If suspects really do find the experience of being 
held in custody  as distressing as Skinns and Choongh suggest,45 then this doubling of 
the maximum detention period seriously  decreases the level of protection suspects have 
against experiencing emotional distress.
3.4 Protecting the Right to Silence
a) What protection should the suspect be afforded in respect of the RTS?
40
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A third key protection that the RLA might secure is protection of the suspect’s legal 
rights at the point of detention, and the right that has most often been discussed in this 
respect is the right to silence (RTS). The RTS is a right that has been derived from the 
presumption of innocence, an important  right that forms part of most international 
conventions of human rights that deal with criminal matters (it is, for example, 
contained in Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights). It is important 
at the outset to be clear about terminology.46 The presumption of innocence refers to the 
right of a suspect to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by  the State. From this a 
privilege against self-incrimination can be derived - the privilege of the suspect to 
refuse to assist the prosecution in proving the case against him. From the privilege 
against self-incrimination two further rights can be derived - the RTS (which covers the 
right of a suspect to refuse to answer questions or provide oral testimony) and the right 
not to provide other forms of material assistance to the State (such as bodily  samples or 
real evidence). 
Our interest here is in the RTS and it should be stressed that the this is rarely (if ever) an 
absolute right and it has certainly  not been held to be so by the European Court  of 
Human Rights.47 In all of the major common law jurisdictions it is restricted in some 
way, the two most common ways of doing that being either directly penalising a suspect 
for refusing to provide information,48 or by drawing adverse inferences at a later stage 
from a refusal to answer questions.49 In Scotland the RTS is relatively  extensive. There 
are, for example, no adverse inference provisions of the sort that operate in England and 
Wales. However, even here it is not absolute as there are various statutory restrictions 
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that penalise a failure to provide information,50 including some relating to the provision 
of information prior to or during the detention process itself.51
Unfortunately, suspects might not understand the RTS and the effect upon their defence 
it may have. Weisselberg states that “the social science literature now shows that we 
cannot assume that warnings effectively enable suspects to understand their rights, 
given the varying language of the warnings and the varying capabilities of suspects, 
among other reasons”.52  It can be said then, that legal assistance may play a key role in 
assisting the suspect to navigate the law on the RTS - whatever that law may be in the 
jurisdiction in question. The role that legal assistance might play in this regard can be 
broken down into three types of protection: protecting the suspect by helping him to 
understand the RTS; protecting the suspect by helping him to identify the most 
appropriate choice in respect of whether or not  he decides to remain silent in the face of 
police questioning; and protecting the suspect by helping him to enforce this choice 
during the police interview.53 Each will be discussed in turn.
The first issue that  we might be concerned with, then, is that a suspect might not 
understand the legal provisions relating to the RTS. When one considers that the lack of 
cognitive understanding of an accused may be impaired at such an emotionally charged 
moment as detention, this danger is heightened. The way in which information is given 
about the RTS to a suspect is normally via the caution that is read by police when a 
suspect is detained. However, there is evidence to suggest that understanding of the 
caution is poor among those who pass through the criminal justice system. The studies 
by Shepherd et al,54 and Clare et al,55  suggest that a significant proportion of individuals 
who are arrested and detained for questioning are at risk of not understanding this 
aspect of their legal rights. These studies showed that only eight and 42 per cent 
respectively of adult participants fully understood the caution. Little wonder then that in 
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54 EW Shepherd, AK Mortimer, R Mobasheri, “The police caution: comprehension and 
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the conclusion of their paper Clare et al state that, “[t]he complexity  of the current 
caution means that it is essential for suspects to receive good quality legal advice prior 
to, and during, police questioning, and at court.”56 Understanding is important not only 
because it is unfair to the suspect if he cannot understand, but also because if it is found 
that a suspect did not understand the caution at the time of interview, his statements may 
be ruled inadmissible.57  This may potentially lead to the acquittal of factually guilty 
persons on the basis that any confession they made is ruled as having been unfairly 
obtained. 
The research carried out by Shepherd et al and Clare et al referred to above was 
undertaken in England and Wales where the caution is relatively complex because of the 
adverse inference provisions there. Little research has been undertaken into the 
understanding of the caution in Scotland, but the research that does exist suggests that 
despite the fact that the caution is relatively simple, understanding is still problematic, 
not least among juvenile suspects. A study of the comprehension of a Scottish version of 
the caution undertaken by Cooke and Philip,58 amongst 100 young offenders,59 suggests 
that many suspects simply did not understand the standard caution. The study’s findings 
showed that, “[t]he overall level of comprehension was low: while 89% per cent 
claimed to fully  understand the caution only 11% per cent were considered to have a 
complete understanding”.60 
Cooke et al’s study focused on juvenile suspects. We might equally  be concerned, 
however, about vulnerable adult suspects. One of the most comprehensive and well 
known studies in this area was that undertaken by Cloud et al.61  They conducted an 
empirical study to find out the extent to which vulnerable adults suffering from mental 
illness understood the Miranda warning.62 Admittedly this study was undertaken in the 
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US context, but the caution is not dis-similar to that given in Scotland and does not 
contain any references to adverse inferences, as the English caution does. They found 
that their subjects simply did not comprehend the caution; that the meaning of the words 
incorporated within the caution were incomprehensible to them; nor could they  form an 
opinion about the caution that enabled them to make meaningful and knowledgeable 
decisions. Their study  comprised three tests, each of which analyzed crucial 
components in the understanding the Miranda right - the vocabulary, warning, and 
concept tests.63 Each were designed to test the vulnerable subject’s ability to understand, 
communicate and make decisions in relation to waiver.64  Of the vulnerable adults 
suffering from mental illness who took part, only 20 per cent, 27 per cent and 38 per 
cent respectively for each test65 understood what the words, meaning and implications 
of the caution actually meant. As regards juvenile suspects, the study  concluded that age 
by itself did not influence any of the four tests used to measure understanding of the 
caution.66 Cloud et al concluded that the Miranda right was, and remains, problematic 
for all sections of suspects to understand, be they juvenile or adult, but especially  so 
amongst those vulnerable suspects with mental disability. If a suspect suffers from this 
then other factors will, “...not overcome the disabled person’s inability to understand the 
warnings”.67 
Understanding of the RTS, therefore, is clearly a potential problem that is not 
necessarily addressed by simply reading the caution to a suspect, as Lord Hope noted in 
McGowan v B, when, after reviewing the relevant research, he stated that, “[I]t serves as 
a warning that it should not be taken for granted that everyone understands the rights 
that are being referred to”.68
Second, there is the issue that a suspect might need assistance in making the most 
appropriate choice as to whether to exercise his RTS, given the legal consequence of 
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doing or not doing so.69 Even suspects who do understand the law might not understand 
the likely  consequences of different decisions they could take and thus identify their 
best strategy accordingly. The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, for example, 
whose recommendations formed the basis of PACE in England and Wales, held this 
view when they stated that those accused may not be fully  aware of the “implication” or 
the benefits in, “exercising” this right.70
Third, for those suspects who have chosen to exercise their RTS, they may need 
assistance in order to maintain this decision in the face of the coercive atmosphere of 
the interview room.71 In his speech in Cadder, Lord Hope observed that the RTS must 
be respected once exercised. He stated:72
“A person is … free to speak to the police and can provide them with self-
incriminating answers if he is willing to do this, and his answers will be 
admissible if they  are truly voluntary…The test is whether the will of the 
person to remain silent … has been respected.”
As already  discussed in section 3.2 above, however, the interview room, by its very 
nature, can be a pressurized and stressful environment. Questioning is likely to be, 
“...prolonged, and the atmosphere is likely  to be coercive”.73 Respecting the will of the 
suspect who wishes to stay silent in this context might require more than simply telling 
him that he can do so. Even those who do decide that they wish to stay silent may find 
this difficult to put into effect in practice, especially  if this is their first  time in custody 
and they are unfamiliar with the environment. This even more so if they are a 
vulnerable adult or a juvenile suspect. 
We can conclude, then, that the suspect faces three main challenges regarding his RTS. 
Firstly, the suspect might not understand it; secondly, he needs to make the appropriate 
choice regarding exercising it or not. Furthermore, should the suspect  choose to exercise 
his RTS he will require the strength to maintain and implement the choice in the 
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72 Cadder [2011] UKSC 43 per Lord Hope at 56.
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stressful atmosphere of the interview room. In respect of all these challenges, as noted 
above, there is a convincing case for providing the suspect with assistance of some 
description in order that he can exercise this right effectively. Without such assistance 
many suspects, including the most vulnerable, will not be protected. 
b) What measures existed for suspects pre-Cadder to help facilitate the RTS?
The first  point to note is that in Scotland, prior to Cadder (and indeed subsequently  to 
Cadder as the law has not changed in this area), suspects have a relatively extensive 
RTS. It is not permissible for a court to draw adverse inferences from a suspect’s failure 
to answer police questions,74 (as it  is in, for example, England and Wales). The suspect 
does have to provide some basic information regarding his identity  to a police officer if 
he is suspected of committing a criminal offence,75 but aside from this (and any other 
minor statutory restrictions of the right to silence that apply  in Scotland), the RTS is 
very wide. 
Prior to Cadder very little was done to help suspects understand and exercise their RTS. 
They  would be read the standard caution, but as we have seen above, simply reading the 
caution to a suspect  does not necessarily mean that he understands it. A suspect who 
wished to consult a solicitor to weigh up  his choices prior to being interviewed had no 
right to receive this advice, and he certainly  had no right to have a solicitor present in 
the interview room to help him exercise his choice. The exception to this was that a 
vulnerable adult suspect  or a child suspect would have had access to an appropriate 
adult (discussed in section 2.3 above) but as was discussed earlier the role of such a 
person is to provide emotional support and facilitate communication and not  to provide 
any legal assistance. This would be helpful in the context of explaining the RTS in 
appropriate language but not much beyond this that is relevant in the present context.
We can conclude, then, that prior to Cadder very little protection existed for suspects, 
aside from child suspects or vulnerable adult  suspects, in terms of helping them to 
enforce their RTS or to understand how to make an informed choice regarding this right. 
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Even for child and vulnerable adult suspects, the support that was available was not 
from a legally qualified individual and therefore likely  to be of only limited assistance 
in terms of things like identifying the best strategy in terms of answering questions or 
not (which requires a modicum of legal knowledge). The final thing that could perhaps 
be said is that the relatively short  maximum period of detention (six hours) meant that 
suspects would not face questioning for lengthy periods and thus any  suspect who 
wished to stay silent would have only  a limited time in which he needed to stick to his 
decision. However, this is not  a very convincing argument as six hours, while low in 
comparison to other jurisdictions,76 is still a long time in which to face questioning and 
thus this can hardly be seen as much of a positive. 
c) Has the RLA helped to improve the protection available to suspects in respect of the 
RTS?
The next question is whether the RLA has improved the protection available to suspects 
in respect of understanding the RTS, identifying the most appropriate course of action 
and in sticking to any decision to remain silent throughout police questioning. It is 
suggested here that it has – with some qualifications. Each of these three areas will be 
discussed in turn.
To take understanding first, the RLA has definitely improved the position. We saw 
earlier that many  suspects do not understand even the relatively straightforward Scottish 
caution, especially if they are young or vulnerable. A lawyer is likely  to be of 
considerable assistance here in helping suspects to understand what the RTS means and 
its implications. It  was discussed earlier that as the law stands at the moment, a suspect 
does not  have a right to a face to face consultation with a solicitor until the point of 
police questioning, as legal assistance can in theory be provided by any means possible, 
such as the telephone. In the context of understanding, however, this is unlikely to 
matter as the RTS can easily be explained in a telephone conversation.
On the issue of identifying the appropriate choice of whether or not  to exercise the RTS, 
the RLA constitutes an improvement here too. A suspect will be in a much better 
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position to do this in conjunction with a legal adviser, who will be able to explain the 
legal consequences of exercising or not exercising the right in the context of the nature 
of the charge and the evidence against them.77 If what we are concerned about here is to 
allow the suspect to make “...decisions about co-operation to be made on a more 
informed basis”,78  then the RLA has certainly made things better in this respect. Like 
explaining the RTS, helping a suspect to identify  his best interests in terms of exercising 
it can probably  be done reasonably effectively by  telephone and thus the fact that the 
RLA does not extend to physical presence until police questioning starts is not a major 
barrier in this respect.  
The final issue is whether the RLA has improved the suspect’s position in terms of 
assisting him in enforcing any  decision to remain silent in the face of police 
questioning. It can be concluded without doubt that the RLA has improved matters. It is 
especially significant in this respect that the CJSB has established a right for a solicitor 
to be physically present during police questioning.79  It would be difficult for a legal 
adviser to assist a suspect in this respect if he was not present in the interview room and 
the law in some other jurisdictions has been criticized for not extending the RLA to 
include this. In Canada, for example, the right only extends to a consultation with a 
solicitor during the interview (i.e. the right to stop  questioning and consult with a 
lawyer before questioning resumes) and not to the physical presence of the lawyer in the 
interview room.80  Thus Scots law, in allowing the solicitor to be present during 
questioning, is far superior in this regard and much more effective in terms of providing 
the assistance that  a suspect would need in helping him to stick to a decision to remain 
silent. This is especially important given Sanders and Bridges found that when suspects 
who were recommended by way of telephone advice to stay silent, only a minority 
followed the solicitor’s direction.81
48
77 Leverick, n 2 above, 369.
78 ibid.
79 CJSB, s.24.
80 See R v Sinclair [2010] 2 SCR 310. For criticism see the dissenting opinion of Binnie J in this 
case and also Leverick (n 2) and R Pattenden, “Right to counsel at the police station: United 
Kingdom and Canada” (2011) 15 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 70.
81 A Sanders and L Bridges, “The right to legal advice”, in C Walker and K Starmer (eds), 
Miscarriages of Justice: A review of Justice in Error  (OUP, Oxford) 2004) 83 at 95.
The one note of caution that might be sounded here (aside from the fact that not all 
suspects will take up the RLA, which will be discussed in chapter four) is that there is 
some evidence from England and Wales to suggest that solicitors are sometimes very 
passive during police questioning and do little to intervene if questioning becomes 
hostile or stressful (see the discussion in section 3.2 above). If this is true in the Scottish 
context (and there is no evidence to suggest that it is) then the degree to which the RLA 
will assist a suspect in enforcing his decision to remain silent might be rather more 
limited, as this does require the solicitor to take an active role at least to some extent.
We can conclude, then, that the introduction of a RLA has improved the protection 
available for suspects to a significant  degree as there is now a legally  qualified source of 
advice available to suspects who request it. A solicitor can explain what RTS means; can 
help  the suspect identify  their best interests in terms of choosing whether or not to 
exercise their RTS; and can help the suspect to enforce his decision to remain silent 
whilst being questioned. This conclusion is supported by  the fact that in some other 
jurisdictions it  has been said that for the RTS to be effective it simply has to be 
accompanied by a RLA: the Canadian Supreme Court, for example, has said that “[i]n 
the context of custodial interrogations, you can’t have one without the other”.82  Until 
the post-Cadder changes Scotland did have one without the other and thus in this 
respect the introduction of a RLA has definitely improved the position. Furthermore, as 
there is clear evidence that young Scottish offenders do not understand the caution/right 
to silence, as the research undertaken by Cooke et  al above indicates, making a right to 
legal assistance compulsory for a child suspect (an issue that will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter four) is a very real increase in protection.
d) Have any post-Cadder changes decreased the level of protection afforded to suspects 
in respect of the RTS?
The next question is whether any of the post-Cadder changes have diminished the 
protection available to suspects in terms of understanding and enforcing their RTS. As 
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we have already seen, presently, no adverse inferences may be drawn from silence 
either at the police questioning stage or at trial.83 As part of his remit, Lord Carloway 
did consider whether the law should be changed in Scotland to permit adverse 
inferences to be drawn from silence. However, as noted in chapter 2, Lord Carloway 
concluded that introducing an adverse inference from silence would be incompatible 
with the presumption of innocence and the right not to self-incriminate.84  His 
recommendation was followed by the Scottish Government and the CJSB makes no 
change to the law on the right to silence. 
Thus in one important respect where there was the potential for the position to be made 
worse for suspects, this has not happened. Indeed, the changes that have stemmed from 
Lord Carloway’s review do nothing to worsen the protections that suspects receive in 
this area, aside from perhaps the impact of a longer detention period which might mean 
that suspects find it more difficult  to remain silent in the face of police questioning if 
they  are being questioned for longer periods. If he had chosen to recommend a change 
in the law relating to the RTS in Scotland by introducing adverse inference provisions, 
this would have left suspects worse off as the complexities of the law in this area would 
have been even more difficult to understand,85 but he did not do that for the reasons set 
out above. We can therefore conclude that the protection the RTS afforded a suspect 
pre-Cadder is not diminished in any significant way by the post-Cadder changes.  
3.5 Preventing wrongful conviction
a) What is it the suspect should be protected against in respect of wrongful conviction?
The final area in which we need to consider the protection afforded to suspects is that of 
preventing wrongful conviction. Before proceeding it is important to clarify the relevant 
terminology. In Scots law, an appeal against conviction will succeed if it  is established 
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that there has been a miscarriage of justice.86  A miscarriage of justice in this context 
does not necessarily mean that  the appellant is factually  innocent – it simply  means that 
either there was some sort of procedural impropriety  that calls into question the safety 
of the conviction or that fresh evidence has emerged which casts doubt on whether the 
appellant should have been convicted. Our concern here is not with a miscarriage of 
justice in this “legal” sense but with preventing the conviction of those who are 
genuinely factually innocent. To avoid any confusion with the legal miscarriage of 
justice terminology, I shall use the term “wrongful conviction” instead of “miscarriage 
of justice”. 
In the past two decades, there have been many more newspaper stories, magazine 
articles, and television documentaries on the plight of the wrongfully convicted than 
ever before.87  As a result, there is greater appreciation by professionals in criminal 
justice that the wrongful conviction of the innocent is a real and ongoing problem. No 
study has attempted to estimate the extent of wrongful conviction in Scotland and thus 
we do not know the scale to which the conviction of the innocent is occurring in this 
jurisdiction.88  In trying to arrive at an answer to this question, we could look at the 
number of successful appeals against conviction. The latest set of figures tells us that 
2,191 people appealed against a criminal conviction in 2008-09 and that 25 percent of 
those appeals were successful.89  Equally, we could also look at the number of cases 
referred by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC), the body 
charged with investigating miscarriages of justice in Scotland. In Scotland, in the first 
ten years of operation of the Commission (i.e. since the SCCRC’s founding in 1999 to 
March 2010), it  referred a total of 74 convictions to the appeal court, 44 of which were 
successfully  appealed.90 These figures, however, only  give a very partial and incomplete 
picture of wrongful conviction. For a start there may  be factually  innocent people who 
have not appealed against their conviction or applied to the Commission. In addition, 
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and most importantly, the fact that a conviction was quashed does not necessarily mean 
the person concerned was factually innocent as this is not the test the appeal court uses 
to quash convictions in Scotland. As noted above, the test that it does use is whether or 
not there has been a miscarriage of justice, and this is not the same thing as factual 
innocence. 
Some assistance in assessing the scope of the problem of wrongful conviction might be 
gained from other jurisdictions. In the US context, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 
examined wrongful conviction in 2010 through their expert working group and found 
that on a conservative estimate a figure of one per cent to 3.3 per cent existed but on a 
less conservative estimate the rate might be as high as five per cent.91  Likewise, 
Risinger estimates the wrongful conviction rate to be around one to two per cent in the 
United States.92  On the assumption that these figures translate to the Scottish context, it 
can be concluded that there is some basis for thinking that wrongful conviction is a 
problem. Now admittedly this is a major assumption to make – we do not have any 
evidence in the Scottish context that wrongful conviction is such a widespread problem 
as this. But even if it is not so at  present, this may simply be because the legal system is 
currently effective at preventing it and we cannot assume that it will continue to do so 
(on which see the discussion of the removal of the corroboration requirement below).
What is of particular interest here is the extent of wrongful conviction based on false 
confessions. Sanders and Bridges note that miscarriages of justice have historically 
arisen in England and Wales when confession evidence was the only  evidence.93 The 
Innocence Project, a U.S. non-profit  legal clinic that assists those wrongfully  convicted 
of crimes, claims that 8% of wrongful convictions are due to false confessions prompted 
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by police.94  In Bedau and Radelet’s study,95  false confessions were the third leading 
cause of wrongful conviction. In Warden’s study they  were the single leading cause.96 
There are various causes of wrongful conviction, but the subject of this thesis is the 
RLA and false confessions are the cause that legal assistance at detention stage has the 
best chance of preventing. With the other main causes (eyewitness misidentification, 
unreliable forensic evidence, lying witnesses),97  providing legal assistance at the 
detention stage is much less likely  to have an impact on them.  As there is not space 
here to examine all the possible causes, I have therefore chosen to focus on false 
confessions for the reasons above. I do, however, recognise that the removal of the 
corroboration requirement may have implications for some of the other main causes of 
wrongful conviction (especially eyewitness misidentification), but I am not going to 
examine that issue here. 
We have seen that there is evidence to suggest that this is concerning and although it is 
very difficult to assess how frequently false confessions are made, there is more than 
enough evidence to suggest that they do occur.98  Why are false confessions such a 
significant cause of wrongful conviction? In part the answer lies in the fact that a 
confession is such a persuasive form of evidence. Kassin et al state that, “[i]nterrogation 
is an evidence-gathering activity  that is supposed to occur after detectives have 
conducted an initial investigation and determined, to a reasonable degree of certainty, 
that the suspect  to be questioned committed the crime”.99  Given this approach to 
interrogation of a suspect the confession, once made, would appear to confirm and close 
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any further investigation even in the face of a confession “contradicted by external 
evidence, or the product of coercive interrogation”.100  With statements such as, “[t]he 
introduction of a confession makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous, and 
the real trial, for all practical purposes, occurs when the confession is obtained”,101 one 
can see the power confession evidence has. Research by Blandon-Gitlin et al supports 
this conclusion by  establishing that even when a coercive technique is suggested as 
having been used to obtain a confession during interrogation, juries hesitate to draw 
such a conclusion.102 In addition, lay people find it very difficult to accept that anyone 
would confess to a crime they did not commit, even if coercive techniques were applied 
(even though research has consistently shown that this does in fact happen).103
Why then do suspects make false confessions? In examining this issue, the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice observed individuals make false confessions for a 
wide range of reasons:104 (i) people may make false confessions entirely  voluntarily as a 
result of a morbid desire for publicity  or notoriety; or to relieve feelings of guilt about a 
real or imagined previous transgression; or because they cannot distinguish between 
reality  and fantasy; (ii) a suspect may confess from a desire to protect someone else 
from interrogation and prosecution; (iii) people may see a prospect of immediate 
advantage from confessing (e.g. an end to questioning or release from the police 
station); and (iv) people may be persuaded temporarily by  the interrogators that they 
really have done the act in question. It may also be the case that a suspect simply wishes 
to please their interrogator.
Similar conclusions have been drawn by psychologists who have researched this issue. 
The leading researchers in this area are the social psychologists Saul Kassin and 
Lawerence Wrightsman, who have identified three distinct types of false confession. 
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They called these “coerced-compliant”; “coerced-internalized”, and “voluntary”.105 As a 
result of overpowering questioning, a suspect may  give what is known as “coerced-
compliant” confession, where, “the suspect publicly professes guilt in response to 
extreme methods of interrogation, despite knowing privately that  he is truly innocent”. 
Although fully understanding that  his confession is false, in order to avoid the duress 
and pressurization of an interrogation, he takes the pro-active decision of making a false 
confession. To a suspect in this position it may appear that  he has little option but to 
yield to the accusations being made against him as he is exhausted and can see no other 
way to stop the traumatic and fraught experience he is going through. Others may be of 
the opinion that if they  concede to the allegations being made, then they  will be free to 
go or may avoid the dreaded outcome of whatever their interviewers are detailing as 
their fate, should they not confess. When a suspect perceives that he has no choice but 
to comply, his resultant compliance and confession are, by definition, involuntary and 
the product of coercion. “Coerced internalized” confessions describe the situation when 
a suspect  becomes convinced that they  did in fact commit  the offence. The suspect 
becomes uncertain of their own recall of the event they are accused of. Lastly, there is 
what is described as ‘voluntary’ confession, “occurring in the absence of elicitation”. 
These are confessions made by the suspect entirely spontaneously  and not in response to 
any questioning or other type of pressure from the police. They can occur for all sorts of 
reasons including attention seeking or the protection of another person. 
The risk of false confessions is particularly prevalent among vulnerable suspects. 
Vulnerable adults who are mentally ill, cognitively impaired, psychologically  fragile, 
drug and alcohol abusers, etc, are particularly at risk due to their lack of 
communication, retention and diminished conceptual understanding. Lacking the 
capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of their actions, this makes them 
particularly vulnerable to making misleading, false or incriminating statements.106  The 
same can be said of juvenile suspects.107
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We can conclude then that the suspect faces a number of potential challenges when 
trying to protect  himself against wrongful conviction on the basis of a false confession 
he has given. The pressure of the interview room and police tactics are a constant threat 
to the suspect whilst he tries to retain composure in order to make clear choices and 
decisions regarding the case against him. Should the suspect be a vulnerable adult or 
juvenile who lacks capacity, this threat becomes greater still. False confession, while 
clearly  not a regular occurrence, is a very  real risk, especially among this vulnerable 
population and once a confession has been obtained, it is a potent source of evidence as 
it is very difficult  to persuade a jury  that anyone would ever confess to a crime they 
genuinely did not commit. 
b) What measures existed for suspects pre-Cadder to help protect them against wrongful 
conviction?
The question then arises of what protections existed for suspects prone to making false 
confessions prior to Cadder. Before the 2010 Act, a suspect had a right to request and 
receive legal assistance, but only at the point of arrest. Only then could they request  the 
right to a private meeting with a lawyer before they appeared at their first court 
appearance.108 Little protection existed in the respect of legal assistance as the lawyer 
could not be in situ for the duration of his client’s interview before arrest. If protection 
against wrongful conviction on the basis of a false confession is going to be effective, 
this requires a solicitor to be able to intervene during police questioning as this is where 
any false confession is likely to be made.
However, three things are of particular note which did help to protect a suspect from 
wrongful conviction based on a false confession. The first  is the requirement for 
corroboration. The requirement for corroboration has been described as an invaluable 
safeguard against wrongful conviction. As the court stated in Morton v HM Advocate:109 
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“No person can be convicted of a crime or a statutory offence except where the 
legislature otherwise directs, unless there is evidence of at least two witnesses 
implicating the person accused with the commission of the crime or offence 
with which he is charged. This rule has provided an invaluable safeguard in the 
practice of our criminal courts against unjust conviction, and it is a rule from 
which the courts ought not to sanction any departure.”
The rule has been described as “...one of the most notable and precious features of Scots 
law’.110  This iconic principle of Scots law has existed for centuries and acts as a 
safeguard against wrongful conviction by requiring the Crown to prove by means of 
corroborated evidence the crucial facts of a case.111  As such, the pre-Cadder position 
(and indeed the position at the time of writing) is that an accused person could not be 
convicted on the basis of his confession alone. There would need to be some supporting 
evidence. There were (and still are) special rules relating to this, in that if the accused 
demonstrated so called “special knowledge” as part of his confession, this would 
provide the necessary corroboration.112  This is when the accused makes a confession 
which contains information within it about how the crime was committed, the rational 
and realistic explanation for which being that only the person who committed the crime 
could possibly possess such information. But the fact remains that a confession alone 
without this element  of special knowledge or some other source of evidence could not 
ground a conviction. While it is not foolproof – research in the US context has shown 
that in some instances of wrongful conviction based on a false confession, the 
confession did actually contain details of the crime that only  the perpetrator should have 
known113 – but it is still an important protection against wrongful conviction. 
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The second is that a confession extracted unfairly would be inadmissible as Scots law 
(discussed in section 3.2 above). This also provides some protection against wrongful 
conviction. The over-riding rule is that a confession will not be admissible unless it has 
been obtained fairly.114 For example, unfair questioning techniques,115 use of threat,116 
entrapment,117  the physical and mental state of the suspect,118  age of the 
suspect,119overheard confessions,120 or lack of proper caution,121 are all factors that can 
mean that a confession has not been obtained fairly and is therefore inadmissible. 
The third is that the suspect had (and still has) an extensive RTS, as set out in section 
3.4 above. It has been said that one of the potential justifications of the RTS is that it 
prevents wrongful conviction by protecting suspects from making false confessions.122 
If it is effective in this respect,123  then this is another protection that was (and still is) 
available, although it does have to be noted in this respect that  the RTS is likely  to be an 
effective protection only when accompanied by the RLA (see the discussion in section 
3.4 above).
In conclusion, then, it does seem that, prior to Cadder, the combined protections of 
corroboration, an extensive RTS and the inadmissibility of confessions obtained 
unfairly, ensured that there were some measures in place to prevent wrongful conviction 
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based on false confession, to counter balance the lack of a pre-arrest RLA available at 
this time. 
c) Has the introduction of a RLA helped to improve the protection available to suspects 
in respects of the prevention of the wrongful conviction?
When considering in what manner wrongful conviction may be prevented by the RLA, 
Leverick suggests three ways in which legal advisers might prevent wrongful 
conviction.124  These are, (i) to act as an independent observer to ensure that the 
suspect’s dialogue with his/her interviewers are accurately recorded, thus limiting the 
scope for the possibility of misrepresentation of admission; (ii) to discourage the use of 
coercive tactics whilst interviewing by  the physical presence of a legal adviser; and (iii) 
to facilitate a suspect to effectively implement and discharge their RTS. Method (iii) has 
already been discussed in the context of protecting the suspect’s RTS (see section 3.4 
above) so will not be considered further here.
Possibility  (i) is that protection might be increased by the lawyer acting as an 
independent observer of the interview and thus being a witness to any  untoward tactics 
used and to what was in fact said by the suspect. This might be thought to be only a 
very limited increase in protection, given that interviews are generally audio-recorded, 
but it  does mean that the solicitor can make sure that all of the interview is in fact 
captured on audio-recording and no tactics were used off-camera. So it can be 
concluded that the introduction of the RLA does provide some (albeit  small) benefit 
over the existing protections.
Possibility  (ii) is that  a solicitor can step in and prevent any inappropriate or coercive 
questioning (or can discourage the use of such tactics simply by just being present). 
Given the fact that such weight is placed upon confessions at  trial by a jury listening 
intently  to evidence obtained pre-trial,125 the impact of the RLA to a suspect at  this stage 
cannot be underestimated. The fact  that a solicitor can be physically present during the 
interview is key here. He would be on hand to prevent any attempt at  manipulating, 
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misleading or coercing the suspect into giving false or incriminating statements. 
Independent monitoring of police tactics and the continual supporting, advising or 
reminding the suspect of his rights can all be facilitated by the fact that a legal adviser is 
an independent  observer in situ during the interview.  With the increase in access now 
afforded to a suspect to his legal adviser by way of the CJSB,126  this can only improve 
the protections that were available prior to Cadder. 
When false confessions are made voluntarily, whether they are made through 
diminished mental capacity, pressure, mistaken understanding, or exacerbated by police 
tactics, it is clear that access to a lawyer does provide some protection. Brookman and 
Pierpoint make this point in describing the RLA as, “a fundamental safeguard against 
wrongful conviction”.127  Of course, should an accused be absolutely  determined to 
supply a false confession, there is little a legal adviser could do to prevent this. 
However, if the suspect is coerced-compliant  or coerced internalised into making an 
admission,128 then there may  indeed be scope for the legal adviser to provide emotional 
support in order to reduce the likelihood of his client making a false confession. The 
lawyer also may  further a suspect’s understanding and subsequent use of his RTS, as 
discussed earlier. 
Having said that, the degree of protection that a solicitor can provide here should not be 
over-stated. The evidence that lawyers (at  least in England and Wales) are sometimes 
very passive when coercive tactics are used by the police during questioning (see the 
discussion in section 3.2 above) should sound a note of caution here. But it can be 
concluded that even if this is the case, the degree of protection that suspects have here is 
greater than it  was prior to Cadder when a suspect had no right  to have a solicitor 
present when being questioned at all.
d) Have any post-Cadder changes decreased the level of protection afforded to suspects 
against wrongful conviction?
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The final question is whether any of the post-Cadder changes have reduced the level of 
protection against wrongful conviction. At the outset it should be noted that they have 
done so in a minor way by  increasing the maximum detention period permitted to 
twelve hours (under the CJSB). Suspects who are held for longer might be more prone 
to making false confessions, especially  if they see these as a means to escape the 
stressful conditions of detention. The most  significant way in which the post-Cadder 
regime has changed things, however, is in respect of the corroboration requirement and 
it is to this that we now turn.
The Scottish Government accepted Lord Carloway’s proposal to remove a cornerstone 
of Scots criminal justice procedure, that of the requirement for corroboration.129  The 
CJBS, s.57(2), provides that: “If satisfied that a fact has been established by  evidence in 
the proceedings, the judge or (as the case may be) the jury  is entitled to find the fact 
proved by the evidence although the evidence is not corroborated”.130 Lord Carloway’s 
Report states that corroboration has “lain at the heart of the criminal justice system 
since time immemorial...and has been an invaluable safeguard against the occurrence of 
miscarriages of justice”.131  If corroboration is removed without any substitute 
safeguards or rules of law being put in place, there is a genuine prospect of criminal 
trials being conducted lacking any  protection against wrongful conviction beyond the 
“beyond reasonable doubt” standard. Senators of the College of Justice, advocates and 
solicitors and legal academics alike have criticised the proposal, “amid fears it could 
lead to miscarriages of justice”.132 If one also factors in that Police Scotland are vocally 
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very critical of the proposals,133 there is much controversy surrounding corroboration’s 
abolition and its subsequent impact  on the protection available to suspects it currently 
provides. 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to enter the debate on whether or not the 
corroboration requirement should be abolished or retained. Suffice to say  that there is a 
large and ever increasing volume of academic literature on this issue,134  alongside 
submissions on this subject to the various consultations that have taken place and to the 
Justice Committee and I do not intend to add to it. What I am concerned with here is the 
narrower issue of whether by removing the corroboration requirement, suspects might 
be left  with a weaker protection against wrongful conviction based on a false 
confession. There is little doubt that - without additional safeguards being introduced135 
- that they  will be. Previously  a confession made by a suspect could not form the sole 
evidence upon which a conviction could be based - it required to be corroborated by 
some other form of evidence. Admittedly due to the fact  that “special knowledge” could 
be that piece of corroborative evidence rather than evidence that is truly from an 
independent source, the protection this provided was not as strong as it  might have 
been. But it was still a protection of sorts.
It might be said that this does not matter because other jurisdictions manage well 
without a corroboration requirement. However, two points can be made here. For one 
thing, some jurisdictions, even though they do not have a general requirement for 
corroboration, do require that confession evidence is corroborated.136  Second, even in 
those jurisdictions that do not  require a confession to be corroborated, many of these 
62
133 BBC, 'Police Body Criticises Plan To Abolish Corroboration Rule' BBC News (21 October 
2012) accessed 21 January 2014.
134 See e.g. FP Davidson and PR Ferguson, “The corroboration requirement in Scottish criminal 
trials: should it be retained for some forms of problematic evidence?” (2014) 18 International 
Journal  of Evidence and Proof 1-27; P Duff, “The requirement of corroboration in Scottish 
criminal cases: one argument against retention” [2012] Crim LR 513; D Nicolson and J Blackie, 
“Corroboration in Scots law: ‘archaic rule’ or ‘invaluable safeguard?” (2013) 17(2) Edin LR 
152-184; D Thomson, “A defence of corroboration in criminal law” 2012 SLT  7-11.
135 At this stage we do not know whether any will be introduced and if they are what these might 
be. This will depend on the recommendations of Lord Bonomy’s review (see the discussion of 
this in chapter 2).
136 See FP Davidson and PR Ferguson, “The corroboration requirement in Scottish criminal 
trials: should it be retained for some forms of problematic evidence?” (2014) 18 International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof 1 at 19-20.
jurisdictions instead have a body of rules of law designed to protect against wrongful 
conviction and to exert control over the quality of evidence upon which a person can be 
convicted. For example, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, protections include 
the option of a preliminary committal hearing in court to test the quality  of evidence and 
tighter regulation of police investigation and conduct in obtaining and recording 
evidence.137 Unanimous verdicts are required in the first  instance; and wider grounds for 
appeal exist where the verdict is “unsafe”.138  Trial judges also retain discretion to 
caution juries of the dangers of convicting on the basis of certain forms of 
uncorroborated testimony.139
Corroboration is not the be all and end all in the protection against wrongful conviction 
based on a false confession.140  However, it remains a protection against wrongful 
conviction for a suspect, unless and until it is replaced by other safeguards. One must 
remember that if, as the CJSB intends, a suspect can now be held twice as long in 
detention as he could be pre-Cadder,141 then it also follows that there is more time for a 
suspect to incriminate himself, especially if he chooses not to seek legal assistance.142 
Nor can the Scottish Government’s potential safeguard of an increased majority  jury 
verdict effectively  mitigate corroboration’s removal.143  Section 70(1) sees the Bill 
introduce a potential safeguard against miscarriages of justice, following the abolition 
of corroboration, by  requiring that, “a jury of 15 members may return a verdict of guilty 
only if at least 10 of them are in favour of that verdict”.144  If enacted, the aim of this 
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safeguard is to, “ensure that the weakest cases, where the level of dissent amongst  jurors 
means that the accused’s guilt cannot fairly be said to have been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, would not proceed to conviction”.145 Chalmers, Leverick and Farmer 
note that there would be a worrying reduction against wrongful conviction if this were 
to proceed as proposed. They  state that, “We do not believe that requiring a majority of 
10 jurors from 15, in the absence of corroboration requirement, provides an adequate 
safeguard against wrongful conviction”.146 They go on to state that the combined lack 
of, “..no corroboration...near-simple majority  requirement...and minimal supervision of 
jury verdicts”,147  would only serve to reduce Scotland’s protection against  wrongful 
conviction compared to that of any similar jurisdiction.148 Indeed, Chalmers states that a 
2006 study published by the Council of Europe indicates that a number of member 
states are doubtful about conviction on the basis of a single source of evidence in 
particular contexts, and apply rules that proscribe it.149  He continues, “Such rules 
provide a lesser safeguard against wrongful conviction than the Scottish corroboration 
rule, but they provide significantly more of a safeguard than would remain in Scotland 
were the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill to be enacted in its current form”.150  It 
therefore remains difficult to reconcile how guilt  has been established beyond 
reasonable doubt by a jury who is not required to state its reasons for convicting an 
accused.  This is further exacerbated where there has been only  one piece of evidence (a 
confession) which has not been accepted by up to five out of fifteen jurors,151  post 
implementation of the CJSB. This is especially  problematic because, as we have seen, 
juries have considerable difficulty in believing that anyone would ever confess to a 
crime they did not commit (even though the research evidence suggests otherwise).
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To conclude, then, the CJSB leaves suspects considerably worse off in terms of 
protection from wrongful conviction than they were prior to Cadder. It  does so both 
because of the increase in the maximum time permitted for the detention of suspects 
and, more significantly, because it will remove the longstanding requirement for 
corroboration in criminal cases. It  is not known at the moment what – if any  – 
protections against wrongful conviction will be put in place to compensate for this. This 
will only be known after Lord Bonomy’s review has reported and the Scottish 
Government has reflected on his recommendations. As things stand at the moment, 
though, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that  there is, at least, considerable 
potential to make things much worse in this respect.
3.6 Summary of chapter 3
This chapter of the thesis has identified the various protections that might be important 
to provide to detained suspects. In respect of each of these, it has assessed the level of 
protection that existed prior to Cadder, how this has been improved (if at all) by the 
introduction of the RLA in Scotland and how any other post-Cadder changes have 
impacted on the level of protection provided. It has, however, only provided a partial 
account because it  has proceeded on the assumption that the RLA will be taken up by all 
suspects (or at  least all suspects who would benefit from it). This is likely to be far from 
the case and therefore it is necessary now to add this additional factor into the 
discussion. As such, chapter four goes on to look at likely take up rates of the RLA and 
the impact that these may have on the level of protection provided in each of the four 
areas identified. 
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CHAPTER FOUR
ASSESSMENT
4.1 Introduction
Having identified and examined the protections legal assistance might offer to suspects, 
this chapter will attempt to make an overall assessment of whether or not, on balance, 
suspects are left better protected in the post-Cadder regime following the introduction 
of the right to legal assistance (RLA). To make this assessment I will examine the 
RLA’s overall impact on the prevention of ill treatment; the prevention of emotional 
distress; the protection of the right to silence (RTS); and the prevention of wrongful 
conviction. Each will be examined separately and a conclusion reached. However, 
before I attempt to reach any conclusions a final concern must be discussed: that of 
suspects who, in spite of the additional protections now afforded by  way of the RLA, 
might waive this right and therefore might not benefit from the improved protection it 
potentially provides. The issue of waiver and take up  rates of legal assistance will now 
be examined. 
As such, this chapter proceeds as follows. First, it examines the law on waiver as it 
presently stands (assuming that the CJSB comes into force). Second, it examines the 
available evidence on the rate of waiver of the RLA, both the limited evidence that 
exists in Scotland to date and the evidence that exists from England and Wales, where 
the RLA has been in existence for longer. Third, and finally, against the background of 
this information, the chapter reassesses the extent to which detained suspects are likely 
to be better protected as a result of the post-Cadder changes.
4.2 The law on waiver
The first issue to be discussed is the legal provisions on waiver. It is not an absolute 
requirement of any legal system in which the RLA exists that waiver of the RLA be 
regulated. The law could simply stay silent  on this issue, as it  did in the emergency 
legislation, in which case any  suspect could waive the RLA in any circumstances 
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without it being any concern of the legal system in question. There is an argument for 
this state of affairs – the notion that it  should be made a compulsory legal requirement 
even if the suspect is adamant that he does not need or require such legal assistance 
might be seen as objectionable to both one’s personal freedom of choice and one’s 
freedom of action.1
However, there are reasons why this might not be appropriate. The argument could be 
made that the benefits of having access to legal assistance far outweigh any imposition 
upon the individual or his personal autonomy when one considers the possible legal 
repercussions that may  result from decisions made while the suspect is in custody  (such 
as the decision on whether or not to exercise the RTS).2  It could also be argued that 
suspects should not be permitted to waive rights that they have not been informed 
about, that they  do not understand or where they do not fully understand the 
implications of doing so. Furthermore, it could be argued that for certain types of 
suspects the RLA is so critical during the process of custodial interrogation that they 
should not be permitted to waive the right at all. The obvious candidates here are young 
people and adults who are vulnerable, whether through mental health difficulties or 
some sort of disability.
If the law was going to regulate the issue of waiver of the RLA, it could do so in two 
possible ways. It  could prescribe the circumstances in which waiver of the RLA is valid 
and/or it could make the RLA compulsory for certain types of vulnerable individuals by 
not permitting waiver at all (or by permitting it only in certain restricted circumstances). 
In Scotland, post-Cadder, the law does both of these to some degree and each will now 
be discussed in turn.
4.2.1 The conditions of a valid waiver
The first way in which Scots law regulates waiver is by setting out the conditions in 
which waiver is valid. If these conditions are not met, any confession made by a suspect 
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who has waived his RLA may be deemed inadmissible.3 There were no provisions on 
waiver inserted into the CPSA by the 2010 Act, but Lord Carloway did examine this 
issue and recommended in his report that waiver should be regulated for all suspects. He 
suggested that, as a general rule, waiver of the RLA should be allowed but must be 
express and recorded, and the suspect must have been “fully  informed of the right”.4 At 
around the same time that Lord Carloway was writing, however, the issue of waiver was 
examined in detail by  the UK Supreme Court  in the case of McGowan v B,5 and it is this 
case that is the leading authority on waiver of the RLA in Scotland.6
In McGowan v B, before the commencement of a police interview, B had been given the 
offer of legal assistance but  declined. His waiver of the RLA took place without his 
lawyer having had the opportunity to advise him separately regarding the consequences 
of waiver. Due to this, B’s solicitor lodged a Devolution Minute stating that  B’s right to 
a fair trial under Article 6(3)(c) would be breached if the Crown were to lead evidence 
of his police interview. The Supreme Court had to consider two questions which 
effectively both concerned the issue of whether it would necessarily be incompatible 
with articles 6(1) and 6(3)(c) of the ECHR for the Lord Advocate to lead and rely  on 
evidence answers given during a police interview of a suspect in custody where he was 
informed of his RLA but, without receiving advice from a lawyer, stated that he did not 
wish to exercise it. The Supreme Court held unanimously  that no rule existed that whilst 
in police custody, a suspect could only waive his RLA before and during police 
questioning if he had first received legal advice as to whether or not he should do so.7 
More importantly for our purposes, however, the Supreme Court set out the minimum 
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6 The case is discussed in RM White and PR Ferguson, “Sins of the father: the sons of 
Cadder” [2012] Crim LR 357 at 363-364. Another case (that of Birnie v HM Advocate [2011] 
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7 Lord Kerr dissented on some issues of detail (notably the extent to which ECtHR 
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conditions that must be satisfied if waiver of the RLA will be held to be valid. Lord 
Hope clearly summarized the Supreme Court’s decision. He stated that:8
“Where the accused, having been informed of his rights, states that he does not 
want to exercise them, his express waiver of those rights will normally be held 
to be effective. The minimum guarantees are that he has been told of his right, 
that he understands what the right is and that  it  is being waived and that the 
waiver is made freely and voluntarily.”
The decision in McGowan is in line with and was informed by relevant case law from 
the ECtHR to the effect that it will not prevent, “...a person from waiving them 
[Convention rights including the RLA] of his own free will”,9 however, waiver must be 
unequivocal,10 and the individual has to be aware of the consequences stemming from 
his decision.11
It is worth noting two further points from McGowan. First, the majority  of the Supreme 
Court were of the opinion that  it is not a necessary  condition of a valid waiver of the 
RLA that the suspect is asked why he wishes to waive the right.12  Nonetheless, the 
CJSB includes a provision in section 24(6) that where the right is waived, the reason 
given by the suspect for doing this must be recorded. Second, all of their Lordships 
were of the opinion that  vulnerable suspects might require additional protection in that 
they  may need to have the nature of the RLA and the consequences of waiving it 
explained to them before it could be validly waived. As Lord Hope put it:13
“ … it should not be taken for granted that everyone understands the rights that 
are being referred to. People who are of low intelligence or are vulnerable for 
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(CD) 269.
12 See e.g. Lord Hope at paras 50-51.
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other reasons or who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol may need to 
be given more than standard formulae if their right to a fair trial is not to be 
compromised.”
McGowan has since been followed in a number of subsequent cases, where the test has 
been applied and in none of them has waiver been found to be invalid.14
4.2.2 Preventing waiver of the RLA by certain vulnerable groups
The second way in which Scots law regulates waiver (or at least how it  will do 
assuming the CJSB comes into force) is by prohibiting waiver by certain categories of 
suspects. As discussed in chapter two, in relation to vulnerable adult  suspects Lord 
Carloway recommended that they should only be able to waive their RLA if an 
appropriate adult also agrees to this.15 The Scottish Government accepted this proposal, 
and has included it within the provisions of the Bill.16 As regards children aged 16 or 17 
years, Lord Carloway proposed that they be allowed to waive their RLA but only  with 
the agreement of a parent, carer or responsible person.17  The Scottish Government 
followed Lord Carloway’s recommendation and the Bill provides that 16 and 17 year 
olds can agree to be interviewed by police without a solicitor only if a “relevant 
person” (parent, carer etc) agrees.18 Lastly, Lord Carloway recommended that no child 
under the age of 16 years can reject the RLA.19  Again, the Scottish Government 
followed Lord Carloway’s proposal and made it explicit within the terms of the 
legislation that under 16s cannot waive their RLA nor can a parent, guardian or other 
person to whom the child is legally entrusted waive the child’s right on his or her 
behalf.20  As noted by Chalmers and Leverick,21  this is the most radical of all of the 
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19 Report para 6.3.31.
20 Section 25(2).
21 See Chalmers and Leverick, n 1 above, 848.
provisions on waiver and goes beyond the equivalent provisions in England and Wales, 
where an appropriate adult can request legal assistance for a child who has said that he 
does not want it, but the child cannot be forced to meet with a solicitor if he does not 
want to.22 
To summarise, then, waiver of the RLA is permitted in Scotland but only  if certain 
conditions are met: (i) express waiver requires to be clearly communicated by the 
suspect; (ii) the suspect must be informed of his right of waiver; (iii) the suspect clearly 
understands what that right is and that he is, in fact, waiving it; (iv) and that the suspect 
is making the decision freely and voluntarily. It is also the case that  waiver is prevented 
outright if the suspect is a child under 16. For children ages 16 and 17 and for 
vulnerable adults waiver is only permitted if an appropriate person agrees with the 
suspect’s decision. 
The impact of these provisions will be discussed subsequently in this chapter. Before 
doing so, however, it is necessary also to examine the evidence on rates of waiver.
4.3 Take up rates for legal assistance
In the previous section, it  was established that waiver of the RLA is permissible (as long 
as the suspect is not a child), although some groups (vulnerable adults and suspects 
aged 16-17) require the permission of another person before they  can do so. The next 
question to consider, then, is the extent  to which suspects who do not fall into these 
categories are likely to waive the right.
Evidence on rates of waiver both from Scotland and from England and Wales can be 
examined in this respect. In the Scottish context, figures published by the Association of 
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22 See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Code C para 6.5A. See the discussion of this in 
Chalmers and Leverick (n 1) at 848-849. The importance of access to a lawyer for children is 
also recognised by all relevant international rules, such as the Guidelines of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice, the Beijing Rules and the 2007 UN 
General Comment N°10 on the Children's rights in juvenile justice. None, however, suggest that 
the right should be made compulsory.
Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS),23  show that since emergency legislation 
was introduced post-Cadder to the date of their publication of figures,24 75 per cent of 
Scottish suspects waived their RLA. This is a remarkably  high statistic. It  does have to 
be taken into account that, at this point, there was no legal provision preventing waiver 
by children and vulnerable adults, but even so this is still a very high figure.
The high figure may be due in part however to the fact that the RLA had only been in 
existence for a short period of time when these statistics were collected. It  is worth 
noting in this respect that Lord Carloway in his Report assumed that  the figures on 
waiver in Scotland would be likely to fall significantly over time and that within a few 
years, “waiver will cease to be the norm”.25 This has been questioned by  Chalmers and 
Leverick, who have accused him of being complacent in this respect.26  It is worth 
therefore looking at evidence from England and Wales where the RLA has existed for a 
far longer period of time.
A number of academics have extensively researched this area in England and Wales and 
the most recent studies have concluded that take-up rates range from as high as 60 per 
cent in a study conducted in 1997,27 to 45 per cent based on 2009 records.28 It is this last 
study, undertaken by  Pleasance et al in 2009, that is probably  the most reliable, as it 
involved the greatest number of suspects and covered the greatest geographical range of 
police stations. This does suggest that as the right becomes more established in Scotland 
the proportion of suspects who waive the right may fall, but if England and Wales is a 
valid guide, then they are not going to fall by that  much as it  seems that a majority of 
suspects in England and Wales still decline the RLA.
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24 23 June 2011.
25 Report para 6.1.46.
26 Chalmers and Leverick, n 1 above, 848.
27 L Skinns, ‘The right to legal advice in the police station: past, present and future’ (2011) Crim. 
L.R. 19.
28 P Pleasance, V Kemp and NJ Balmer, “The Justice Lottery Police station advice 25 years on 
from PACE” (2011) Crim LR 3, 5
This would not be of any particular concern, however, if all of those who declined legal 
assistance were genuinely  in no need of it. It is necessary therefore to look at the 
available evidence on the reasons why suspects decline the RLA. Academics have 
suggested various reasons why a suspect may decline their RLA. Kemp has carried out 
the most  extensive research in this area. She carried out an observational study in four 
large police stations in England and Wales and found that suspects refuse legal 
assistance for reasons that  include fear of delaying their detention, manipulation tactics 
by police, prior bad experiences at the hands of previous solicitors and the simple belief 
that their particular case does not  require legal assistance.29 Her research stressed in 
particular the first of these and she concluded in this respect that:30
“… it was evidence from comments made that there was a perception that 
having a solicitor would lead to delays and thereby extend their time in 
custody. Not surprisingly, such concerns led to some suspects rejecting legal 
advice.”
In his review, Lord Carloway quoted from other recent studies carried out in England 
and Wales, where a variety of factors influencing a suspect’s decision to waive the RLA 
were also identified. These also tally with the reasons suggested by the academics 
above. Reasons listed in the Review include:31
“… factors connected to suspects (including ethnicity, haste, offence 
seriousness, self-defined guilt/innocence, prior experience of custody and of 
legal advisers); the police (including ploys and informal conversations); and 
legal advisers (including their availability, experience and competence)”.
This “let’s get it over with” mentality, was also flagged up by Skinns,32 who found in 
her study that suspects waived the RLA “...in part, because the police tell suspects that it 
takes longer if they have a legal adviser”. Taking the findings of these studies together, 
therefore, although it must not be ruled out that some suspects will waive their RLA for 
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the simple reason that they  have no need for it, this cannot be assumed.33 Factors such 
as a fear that asking for legal advice will prolong detention are also influential.
Criminal Solicitor Advocate John Scott  QC raises similar concerns.34 He reports that at 
a seminar in Brussels,35  Jodie Blackstock of ‘JUSTICE’ presented findings from a 
recent consultation with Scottish defence agents in which she found that the police were 
eluding to suspects that should they wish to exercise their RLA, it would most likely 
result in a delay in their release from detention. Scott concludes by saying that, 
“Blackstock stated that this demonstrated a tendency towards encouraging waiver, and 
this, coupled with the length and complexity of the SARF,36  has fostered a ‘systemic’ 
issue of obstructed lawyer access in Scotland”.37  This might be dismissed as the 
anecdotal evidence of a single individual but  it does chime with the findings of the more 
systematic research undertaken in England and Wales discussed above. 
To summarise, then, the available evidence on the rate of waiver of the RLA suggests 
that a majority  of suspects in England and Wales waive the right. Based on this 
evidence, it  is likely that take up rates of the RLA in Scotland are likely  to continue to 
be low. As discussed, this is of some concern because it is not only suspects who have 
no genuine need for legal assistance who waive the right. At least some suspects waive 
it because, for example, they simply wish to be released from custody and think that 
doing so will accelerate this process.
This worry is tempered to a certain extent by the fact that once the CJSB comes into 
force, waiver will not be permitted for children aged under 16 and vulnerable adults and 
suspects aged 16-17 can only waive the right with the agreement of another person, 
which will make some difference to the eventual figures for waiver in Scotland. It has to 
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be said that these provisions might not be entirely effective in some respects. For one 
thing it is extremely  difficult to identify those in the adult  population who are 
vulnerable, a point that has been made by  a number of academic studies.38 The signs 
which Lord Carloway used in his Report of mental illness, personality disorder or 
learning disability are, as he himself makes clear, not always obvious.39 As Smith and 
Tilney have commented, the importance of adequate police training in the identification 
of vulnerable witnesses cannot be overstated.40  For another thing, even if a child or 
vulnerable adult is not permitted to waive the RLA, providing legal assistance does not 
mean that the suspect will necessarily listen to it or follow it, a point Lord Carloway 
himself also recognises.41 However, having said all of that, the child/vulnerable adult 
waiver provisions do mark a significant increase in protection compared to what 
previously  existed for these groups and compared to the equivalent provisions in 
England and Wales.
Having summarised the law and available evidence on waiver, this chapter now revisits 
all the four areas of protection discussed in chapter three in order to arrive at an overall 
assessment of each one in terms of whether or not things have improved post-Cadder.
4.4 Preventing ill treatment: Are suspects left better or worse off post-Cadder?
It was argued in chapter three that  the RLA is an important  safeguard against ill-
treatment of detained persons. As noted in that chapter, prior to Cadder suspects were 
protected against ill treatment in a very limited and general manner, namely by tape 
recording of police interviews, and the inadmissibility  of any  evidence obtained by  way 
of coercion. The suspect had no more protection than the rights as they stood under 
sections 14 and 15 of the unamended CP(Sc)A 1995 - there was no right  for anyone to 
be present with him while being questioned, only  the right to notify one person and a 
solicitor that  he was being held. Appropriate adults (or medical professionals for a 
suspect with obvious health issues) might have been able to check the general detention 
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conditions in which suspects were being kept but there was no general right for an 
independent person to be present for a suspect in detention.
In the post-Cadder regime, protection from ill treatment has improved in a number of 
respects. First, any suspect who requests it can now have a solicitor present in the 
interview room. In situ and acting as an independent witness, a solicitor’s presence may 
deter abuse arising during interrogation, should of course the suspect not waive his 
RLA.  Protection outside of the confines of the interview room has also improved post-
Cadder as under section 36(1) of the CJSB a suspect is entitled to a private consultation 
with a solicitor. This is a more general safeguard on such things as the conditions of 
detention and the physical condition of a suspect. 
However, in one respect protection has worsened, given that the CJSB has extended the 
time limit for detention from six to 12 hours. This does mean that should the police wish 
to exert pressure on a detained suspect, they do now have a longer period in which to do 
so. 
The right of waiver, however, does now have to be factored into this analysis. As 
section 4.3 showed, there is evidence to suggest that the majority of suspects are likely 
to waive their RLA, which means that for these suspects any additional protections 
potentially secured by the RLA will not transpire. Against this, it does have to be said 
that vulnerable adult and child suspects either cannot waive the right or can only do so 
in limited circumstances, so for these suspects the position has improved significantly, 
with the only caveat being the change to the maximum length of detention permitted. 
Having said all of this, as chapter three noted, there is no evidence that ill-treatment is a 
particular problem among detained suspects in Scotland, so in terms of assessing the 
level of protection provided by the RLA this is perhaps not the most important area to 
focus on.
4.5 Prevention of emotional distress:  Are suspects left better or worse off post-
Cadder?
Of perhaps more significance is the issue of preventing emotional distress during 
detention and, as chapter three argued, there exist several areas of concern regarding the 
mental welfare of the suspect in relation to his time spent in detention. It is worth 
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reiterating the findings of research undertaken by Choongh (discussed in chapter 3), 
who interviewed 72 non-vulnerable suspects following their detention at  police stations 
and found that although one-quarter were unmoved by their experience, one-fifth said 
their experience had been “intolerable” and over half sound it “distressing”.42 One must 
bear in mind that Choongh’s study  was concerned with non-vulnerable suspects. A 
vulnerable or child suspect  is likely to feel even more amplified feelings of distress in 
this situation.
Prior to Cadder, very little existed by way of emotional support for suspects in 
detention, aside from the protections referred to in the previous section (appropriate 
adults for child suspects and adult  suspects with vulnerabilities or medical 
professionals). In the post-Cadder regime, prevention of emotional distress has 
improved in a number of respects. As section 36 of the CJSB provides for the right  of a 
person in police custody to have a private consultation with a solicitor at any time, the 
distress a suspect experiences in custody may be reduced if an independent and 
supportive solicitor is present.  Furthermore, section 24 of the Bill provides for the right 
of a person reasonably suspected of committing an offence to have a solicitor present 
during police interview. Certainly compared to the situation prior to Cadder it is 
improvement in that there is now at least someone in whom suspects can call on for 
emotional support in custody.  However, prevention of emotional distress has also 
worsened in one respect. Whilst the CJSB added the right to consult a solicitor at the 
detention stage, it  has also increased the time limit  for detention from six to twelve 
hours. 
How then does the issue of waiver impact on these conclusions? The first  thing to be 
said is that those who are most likely to suffer emotional distress in custody – children 
and vulnerable adults – either cannot waive the RLA or cannot do so unless additional 
safeguards are satisfied. This is a real improvement in protection. It does have to be 
questioned how much emotional support a solicitor will provide – as noted previously, 
he is not after all a trained counsellor – but compared to the situation prior to Cadder 
this has to be an improvement. A solicitor can provide a type of reassurance that an 
appropriate adult cannot – in terms of advising on the legal rules relating to detention 
and the limits of police powers. However, aside from children and adults identified as 
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vulnerable, concern has to be raised because as we have seen the general rate of waiver 
among suspects is likely to be high. In police custody, many  “normal” suspects are also 
likely to be vulnerable, and regarding even those who do have mental health issues or 
disabilities, these will not necessarily be identified and thus the additional protections 
preventing waiver may not be applied. For these groups, emotional support will only be 
given to those who do not waive the right and, as we have seen, at least some suspects 
waive the right because they perceive that exercising it might delay  their release. It is 
not difficult to imagine that emotionally  distressed suspects might be particularly prone 
to doing this, which means that those who are in most need of protection from 
emotional distress may well be those who are least likely to receive it.
We can conclude, then, that in some respects the changes that have occurred subsequent 
to Cadder have left the suspect worse off than he was previously.  Although the post-
Cadder protection has improved as the CJSB provides for the right  of a suspect in 
police custody to have a private consultation with a solicitor at any  time, thus helping to 
alleviate emotional distress, it  has also worsened in one major respect. The doubling of 
the maximum detention period seriously  decreases the level of protection suspects have 
against experiencing emotional distress, even with the changes made to the availability 
of legal assistance. Adding into this the fact that the majority of suspects are likely to 
waive the RLA (aside from those for whom it is compulsory) and that  those who are in 
most distress may waive it because they perceive that it will shorten their period in 
custody, it cannot  be said that Cadder has improved the position overall in terms of 
suspects being protected against emotional distress. 
4.6 Protecting the right to silence: Are suspects left better or worse off post-
Cadder?
As chapter three explained, there are three concerns we might have about  suspects in 
relation to the right to silence (RTS).43 The first issue that  we might be concerned with 
is that a suspect might not  understand the legal provisions relating to the RTS. As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, research has demonstrated that many  suspects are 
unable to fully comprehend the right to silence and its implications due to their mental 
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illness, learning difficulties or simply  the general stress of the moment. Second, given 
the important legal consequences for a suspect’s case in deciding to either exercise the 
RTS or not, there is the issue that a suspect might need assistance in making the most 
appropriate choice in this regard, as a suspect might not understand and comprehend the 
impact of exercising their RTS.44 Third, given the combative and pressurised nature of 
the interview room, those suspects who have chosen to exercise their RTS may need 
assistance in order to maintain their decision.45
Prior to Cadder very little was done in terms of addressing these three concerns. 
Suspects were told about their RTS, but only  by the police. They would not have 
received any support in terms of helping them exercise it  while being questioned, 
should they have wished to do so (aside from any appropriate adult who would be 
present when a child or vulnerable adult suspect was being questioned).
In the post-Cadder regime, the RLA has helped to improve the protection available to 
suspects in respects of the RTS in a number of ways.  This will be of particular 
significance in the case of child or vulnerable suspects. First, section 36 of the CJSB 
provides for the right of a person in police custody to have a private consultation with a 
solicitor at any time. The increased availability  of a solicitor is likely to be of marked 
assistance here in helping suspects to understand what the RTS means and its 
implications, given that, as chapter three established, research has shown that many 
suspects do not understand the Scottish caution. Second, section 24 of the Bill provides 
for the right of a person reasonably suspected of committing an offence to have a 
solicitor present during police interview. This will facilitate a suspect in enforcing his 
RTS, as his legal adviser will be able to explain the legal consequences of exercising or 
not exercising the right in the context of the nature of the charge and the evidence 
against them.46  It is significant in this respect that section 24 specifically provides for 
the presence of a solicitor during the interview – something that, as chapter three 
discussed, is not the case in all common law jurisdictions. However, having said that, 
protection has worsened in one respect. The impact of a longer detention period means 
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that there is now more scope and potential for a suspect to be pressurised by  means of 
coercive techniques to give up their RTS in the face of police questioning over longer 
time periods.
What difference, then, does the issue of waiver make? The first point to note is that it is 
especially significant that waiver is not permitted for children and vulnerable adults (or 
in the latter case not without additional conditions being satisfied). This is because these 
are precisely the sort of suspects who were identified in chapter three as being likely to 
have difficulties understanding the RTS. For vulnerable and child suspects, they are 
almost certainly left  a lot better off after the post-Cadder changes as they  will will now 
be able to have the assistance of a legal adviser in explaining what the RTS means and 
the consequences of choosing to enforce it (or not). For other suspects, however, it is 
less obvious. The fact that the majority of them are likely to waive the RTS (and that it 
is not necessarily  because they  have no need for it) is a concern as here, clearly, the 
potential improvement in protection offered by a solicitor is not going to transpire in 
practice.
Overall, then, it is suggested here that in terms of the protection of the RTS, the 
introduction of a RLA has appreciably  improved the protection available for suspects as 
it does mean that there is now a legally qualified source of advice available to suspects 
who request it, who can explain what the RTS means for them, who can help  identify 
their best interests, and who can help them stick to a decision to remain silent in the 
course of the interview. It is just that because of the likelihood of waiver (aside from 
those suspects who are prevented from waiving the right), this benefit is not going to be 
felt by all suspects who need it.
4.7 Preventing wrongful conviction: Are suspects left better or worse off post-
Cadder?
Chapter three established that wrongful conviction of the factually innocent  is a real and 
concern, wrongful conviction based on false confessions being a leading cause. As 
chapter three established, certain protections did exist  in the pre-Cadder regime, most 
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notably the corroboration requirement and the fact that any confession that had been 
obtained unfairly would not be admissible.
In the post-Cadder regime, protection against  wrongful conviction has improved in one 
respect. With the increase in access now afforded to a suspect to his legal adviser by 
way of section 24 of the CJSB, a solicitor can now be physically present during the 
interview. In that situation a solicitor can step in and prevent any  inappropriate or 
coercive questioning (or can discourage the use of such tactics simply by just being 
present).  However, it has also worsened in a two respects. First, by  increasing the 
maximum detention period permitted to twelve hours (under the CJSB), this creates the 
possibility that suspects who are held for longer might be more prone to making false 
confessions, especially if they see these as a means to escape the stressful conditions of 
detention. Second, and most significantly, the removal of the corroboration requirement 
means suspects will be left with a weaker protection against wrongful conviction based 
on a false confession, (see chapter 3.5(a) above), unless and until additional safeguards 
are introduced, to replace its once significant protection. 
What difference, then, is made by adding the issue of waiver into the overall analysis? 
Again it is highly significant that the RLA cannot be waived by those who may need it 
most in this respect – the young and vulnerable. There is a mandatory legally  qualified 
source of advice available to suspects under 16, along with a safeguard in place to 
prevent the vulnerable adult waiving his RLA without authorization. This is a very 
important protection. Research into the causes of wrongful conviction undertaken in the 
US context has found that young suspects and adults with mental disabilities account 
for the vast majority  of people who are wrongfully  convicted on the basis of a false 
confession they have made.47 Psychologists have also warned of the prevalence of false 
confessions among juvenile suspects and those with “cognitive impairments or 
psychological disorders”.48  The fact that it is precisely  these suspects who are most 
likely to receive the protection of the RLA (as they either cannot waive it or can only do 
so if another person agrees) is a real increase in protection against wrongful conviction 
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based on false confessions. However this does have to be offset against two factors. The 
first is that the presence of a lawyer during questioning is not going to prevent all false 
confessions, as chapter three discussed. Second, even if the RLA does provide some 
limited protection in this respect, this increase in protection has to be offset  against the 
removal of the requirement for corroboration.
Outwith these two categories of suspect, the picture is even less clear. Working on the 
assumption that the majority  of non-vulnerable suspects will waive their RLA, there 
will be a large category of suspects who do not receive even this limited protection and 
they  too will be left without the additional protection of the corroboration requirement 
acting as a safeguard against wrongful conviction. It may be that this is of little concern 
because those suspects who waive the RLA would not have made a false confession 
anyway. However this cannot be concluded with any confidence. It has been 
demonstrated that at least some suspects waive the RLA because they wish to escape 
detention and they perceive that asking for a lawyer will lengthen their detention period. 
As chapter three discussed, psychological research has demonstrated that one of the 
reasons why suspects do sometimes falsely confess is because they believe that 
confessing will lead to release (what Kassin et  al term a coerced-compliant 
confession).49  There does seem to be some cross-over between these groups – those 
who wish to escape detention are both prone to making false confessions and are also 
likely to waive the RLA. 
In conclusion, then, I would argue that the CJSB leaves suspects considerably worse off 
in terms of protection from wrongful conviction than they  were prior to Cadder. It does 
so both because of its increase in the maximum time permitted for the detention of 
suspects and, more significantly, because it will remove the longstanding requirement 
for corroboration in criminal cases, without (as things stand under the CJSB) proper 
protections replacing it. The requirement for corroboration was not a perfect protection 
against wrongful conviction based on a false confession. As chapter three noted, 
confessions could be “self-corroborating” and thus a genuinely independent  source of 
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Procedure” (1985) CA, Sage, 67-94.
evidence was not required. However it was still a protection of sorts – and a not 
inconsiderable one.
It may be that Lord Bonomy’s Review changes this position (by, for example, 
recommending a supporting evidence requirement where a criminal case is based on a 
confession alone) but we cannot assume at present that this will be the case. We can 
conclude then that, as a result of the reforms, suspects are almost certainly less 
protected than they were prior to Cadder now that  the corroboration requirement has 
gone. Although suspects do now have a RLA, which is of some help in preventing 
wrongful conviction based on false confession, this is only ever going to prevent a small 
subset of false confessions, certainly not all of them. Furthermore, the RLA does little to 
stop juries or judges convicting at trial on the basis of a (false) confession alone and no 
other evidence. Given that  research has shown that not all suspects will take up their 
RLA, and that at least some who decline it would most  likely have benefitted from it, 
this creates the alarming scenario of a suspect severely weakened and stripped of 
protections that were once considered central in Scots criminal law. 
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
This thesis aimed to assess the extent to which the introduction of a right to legal 
assistance (RLA) during detention has improved the protection of suspects in a number 
of key  areas, namely the prevention of ill treatment, the prevention of emotional 
distress, understanding and enforcing the right to silence and the prevention of wrongful 
conviction. It did so against the background of the changes that have been already made 
by way of the 2010 Act and also the proposed legislation stemming from Lord 
Carloway’s Review, that of the CJSB, which is currently going through the Scottish 
Parliament. The overall conclusion reached is that in Scotland’s post-Cadder world, 
suspects are now left overall less well protected in key areas than they would have been 
before Cadder. 
There is no doubt that some improvements have been made following the introduction 
of the RLA in each of the areas this thesis examined. In respect of preventing the ill-
treatment of suspects, the introduction of section 24 of the CJSB means that any suspect 
who requests it can now have a solicitor present in the interview room. Similarly, the 
suspect is now better protected outside of the confines of the interview room as under 
section 36(1) of the CJSB a he is entitled to a private consultation with a solicitor. This 
does mean that a solicitor can check on detention conditions and can act as a deterrent 
to any  ill-treatment that might have occurred during questioning, although this 
protection is only going to arise if the suspect’s solicitor uses his presence which the 
right has now afforded to be pro-active during the interview. 
In respect of preventing emotional distress there have also been some improvements. 
The RLA may  help  to relieve a suspect’s negative and stressful experiences whilst in 
custody, given that a non-partisan and objective solicitor can now be present if 
requested. Furthermore, whilst not  purporting to be a trained counsellor, the suspect 
might obtain strengthened emotional assurance and solace from the fact that a qualified 
lawyer who can offer meaningful advice, is physically present during this extremely 
stressful time. This would be especially  relevant for those who are experiencing 
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detention for the first time; may  have chid care or other dependent concerns; or are 
vulnerable by way of mental capacity or age. However, even with the best of intentions, 
there will be a period of time when the suspect’s solicitor is not present until he 
physically arrives, and the suspect is therefore left  vulnerable whilst on his own in 
detention. Furthermore, there is no guarantee in the Bill that assistance will be provided 
in person. The Bill only creates a right to a private consultation and does not guarantee 
that this will take place face to face, or at least not until the point at  which the suspect is 
actually interviewed.1
In terms of protecting the right to silence (RTS), there have also been some 
improvements. The right to have a private consultation with a solicitor at any  time will 
facilitate suspects in understanding what the RTS means and in identifying their most 
appropriate choice in respect of exercising it. Furthermore, the presence of a solicitor 
during questioning will aid a suspect in enforcing his RTS, although as discussed above, 
this will also require the solicitor to take an active role in proceedings.
Finally, protection against wrongful conviction has improved in one respect, as a 
solicitor can now be physically present during his client’s interview by way of section 
24 of the CJSB. As such, he can be on guard to thwart any incongruous or coercive 
questioning that might lead to a false confession, although the extent of protection 
should not be over-stated. As chapter 3 discussed, a solicitor is not going to prevent all 
types of false confession and for any  real increase in protection to occur this requires 
that the solicitor is not passive whilst present.
These improvements are, however, potentially  undermined in three major respects. The 
first of these is the increase in maximum detention time that will be permitted under the 
CJSB, which will now be twelve hours. This is not as bad as it could have been. The 
present situation is that detention can last for a maximum of 24 hours, whereas the 
CJSB does at least  bring this back down to twelve hours. However, this is twice as long 
as the original length of detention permitted and means that  the potential for ill 
treatment and emotional distress is that much greater. It might be said that  this is of no 
concern as there is no evidence that a large number of suspects actually  will be detained 
for twelve hours. ACPOS figures show that in the period from the introduction of the 
85
1 See the discussion and sources in section 2.2 above.
emergency legislation to the time of Lord Carloway’s Report in November 2011, only 
15.7 per cent of cases of detention exceeded the six hours that was originally permitted 
prior to Cadder.2   This would only equate to 350 suspects per annum who would be 
held beyond the twelve hour maximum proposed detention time contained within the 
CJSB. Whilst  this translates to only less than half of one percent of all detentions, it is 
still a significant number of suspects. There is also the danger that this become the norm 
over time, in which case it would mean that things would get even worse for suspects.
The second issue that limits the improvements in protection is that of waiver. As 
discussed in chapter 4, as many as 75 per cent of Scottish suspects waive their RLA.3 If 
this pattern continues, many suspects will not get the benefit of the improved protection. 
This is mitigated to an extent by the radical proposals to prevent waiver for children and 
prevent vulnerable adults from waiving unless other conditions are satisfied. It is also 
unlikely that the figure will remain quite this high. Evidence from England and Wales 
suggests that it  will reduce over time, as chapter four discussed. But it still leaves a 
large body of suspects not benefitting as much as was promised in any of the four areas 
of protection discussed. This is a problem because as the previous chapter 
demonstrated, suspects waive their RLA for reasons other than the fact they do not need 
it, for example because they want to shorten detention time. 
The final issue that compromises the increase in protection is the removal of the 
requirement for corroboration. Of all the areas where in which suspects need to be 
protected, this is the most important as preventing wrongful conviction is going to have 
the biggest impact on the life of a suspect. This protection will be seriously weakened if 
the corroboration requirement is removed. Beforehand, a confession made by a suspect 
could not constitute the sole evidence upon which a conviction could be based - it 
required to be corroborated in some way. The concern is that with wrongful conviction 
based on false confessions, the protection that  the corroboration requirement provided is 
not adequately  compensated for. The RLA only  provides minimal protection in this 
regard as there is a limit  to what a solicitor can do to prevent false confessions. It does 
not in any way compensate for the removal of the corroboration requirement. As 
discussed in chapter three, the corroboration requirement did not provide perfect 
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protection against a wrongful conviction based on a false confession, as a confession 
could be corroborated by special knowledge. However the protection it did provide was 
far more than would be provided by the presence of a solicitor during detention.
In conclusion, then, given the combination of increased detention time, high rates of 
waiver by suspects of their RLA and minimal safeguards currently  proposed to counter 
balance the removal of corroboration, it is extremely difficult to confidently assert that 
in the post-Cadder world, a suspect is now left better protected than before. The 12 hour 
detention period is clearly here to stay and is probably necessary  given the introduction 
of the RLA. There is probably not very much that can be done about waiver rates either, 
without seriously encroaching on the personal autonomy of the suspect. The CJSB does 
at least remove the worst difficulties in this regard by preventing waiver by the most 
vulnerable groups – those who are most in need of all the protections outlined in this 
thesis. However, the one hope expressed here is that Lord Bonomy’s review will 
address the third issue, that of protection against wrongful conviction based on a false 
confession by, for example, retaining a supporting evidence requirement  where a 
confession is the only evidence against a suspect. This would at least ensure that the 
most serious weakening of protection that stemmed from the Cadder decision and Lord 
Carloway’s review would be addressed.
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